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CREATING AN ENVIRONMENTAL NO-MAN’S LAND: 
THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S DEPARTURE FROM 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND INDIAN LAW PROTECTING  A 
TRIBAL COMMUNITY’S HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT 
Claire R. Newman* 
 
Abstract: When Congress set aside reservations as permanent homelands for 
American Indian people, it intended that the reservations remain “livable 
environments.” When resource conflicts arise in “checkerboard” areas outside 
Indian reservations—where land ownership alternates between a tribe, state, 
the federal government and private, non-Indian landowners—disputes over 
regulatory jurisdiction and environmental protection intensify. Two recent Tenth 
Circuit opinions determining the next generation of uranium mining in the 
checkerboard area of the Navajo Nation, depart from the intent of environmental 
laws and fail to uphold federal agencies’ trust responsibilities to the Tribe. These 
cases illustrate the legal vulnerabilities tribal communities in checkerboard 
areas face through the loss of their environmental and public health and the 
potentially massive cost of remediation. This comment urges the federal 
government to strike a more equitable balance of authority, risk and cost by 
retaining environmental regulatory jurisdiction in checkerboard areas and by 
writing Indian Trust Impact Statements that will help ensure that the federal 
government fulfills its trust responsibility to tribes. 
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Today, I am a man who has lost his health, his family and 
his ancestral way of life because of uranium.1 
                                                
* JD Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, 2012. 
 1. The Health and Environmental Impacts of Uranium Contamination in the Navajo 
Nation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) 
[hereinafter Cong. Hearing on Uranium] (statement of Ray Manygoats, Navajo tribal 
member). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Natural resource conflicts scar the history of Indian 
country.2 The focus of these conflicts has evolved with 
changing modes of economic growth, from furs, to farmland, to 
gold, to energy resources. Of existing energy resources in the 
United States, four percent of onshore oil and gas reserves, 
thirty percent of Western coal, and forty percent of uranium 
deposits lie beneath lands in Indian country.3 For some 
companies, the mineral wealth they own in Indian country 
represents the companies’ “intrinsic value” to investors, and 
profits from those minerals depend upon companies’ 
uncompromised access to them.4 
The United States government and American Indian tribes, 
however, value these lands differently. Congress has 
recognized tribal lands as permanent homelands for American 
Indians,5 and courts have recognized Congress’ intent for these 
homelands to provide “livable environments.”6 American 
Indians’ ancestral, spiritual and kinship ties continue to bind 
them to their land.7 Thus, maintaining livable environments is 
                                                
  2. Indian country generally refers to areas within which a tribe’s laws and customs 
and federal laws relating to tribes and tribal members govern. For the legal definition 
of Indian country discussed in this comment, see 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).  
3. Robert T. Anderson et al., FELIX COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 965 
(2005). 
4. Hydro Resources, Incorporated (HRI), a subsidiary of Texas-based Uranium 
Resources, Inc. (URI), described its uranium holdings to investors: “URI’s intrinsic 
value lies in the 183,000 acres and 101.4 million pounds of in-place mineralized 
uranium holdings in New Mexico.” Company News: Uranium Resources, MINING, 
PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Aug. 30, 2010) http://www.mpe-magazine.com/ 
company-news/uranium-resources. See also URANIUM RESOURCES, INC., 
http://www.uraniumresources.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). 
5. Courts have recognized tribes’ water rights as a necessary corollary to the 
establishment of Indian reservations as permanent homelands for tribes for over a 
century. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) (holding that the 
Fort Belknap Reservation was reserved as a “permanent home and abiding place of the 
Gros Ventre and Assiniboine” tribes and that the tribes’ rights to the Milk River 
“necessarily continued through the years.”); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 
1414 (9th Cir. 1983) (same, citing Winters); In re the Gen. Adjudication of All the 
Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. and Source (In re Adjudication of Gila River 
Sys.), 35 P.3d 68, 72 (Ariz. 2001) (same, citing Winters). 
6. “We agree with the Supreme Court that the essential purpose of Indian 
reservations is to provide Native American people with a “permanent home and 
abiding place,” that is, a “livable” environment.” In re Adjudication of Gila River Sys, 
35 P.3d at 72–74 (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963)) (internal 
citation omitted). 
7. Our future is tied to the land. No matter how far we advance as a society, that 
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essential to American Indians’ vibrant future.8 
With continued global economic growth dependent on a 
steady supply of energy resources, resource extraction 
companies and tribes will be inextricably linked for the 
foreseeable future. Federal courts will continue to face the 
challenge of resolving resource conflicts in Indian country. In 
resolving these conflicts, courts are faced with the questions: 
What constitutes Indian country? And, which government—
tribal, state or federal—has authority to approve resource 
development projects there? Courts have dealt with resource 
conflicts on reservations for many years,9 but when these 
conflicts arise in “checkerboard” areas surrounding 
reservations—areas where land ownership alternates between 
tribal, state and federal governments—jurisdictional 
uncertainty complicates regulatory authority.10 Such 
jurisdictional confusion intensifies resource conflicts and 
increases antagonism between tribes, states, the federal 
government and private companies.11 
Two recent Tenth Circuit decisions, Hydro Resources Inc. v. 
Environmental Protection Agency (HRI III)12 and Morris v. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Morris),13 address uranium 
                                                
single fact persists and in some ways constrains our dreams for the future. . . . The 
land, they say, embodies a continuing legacy of natural wealth . . . .True 
environmental self-determination, however, depends upon the ability of Indian 
nations to preserve their landbases and engage in economic development 
according to their own policies and values. 
Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The 
Role of Ethics, Economics and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 
225, 330 (1996). 
8. See id. at 286 n.356 (1996) (noting that Indian communities “cannot afford a 
catastrophe such as Love Canal, where the only means of protecting the population 
from hazardous conditions is removal”). 
9. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (denying the Crow Tribe 
the right to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee lands on the 
Crow Reservation). 
10. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (denying 
Yankton Sioux Tribe the right to regulate solid waste landfill site based on the 
determination that the site was no longer within the exterior boundaries of the 
reservation and that South Dakota had acquired regulatory jurisdiction over the site). 
See generally Judith V. Royster, Of Surplus Lands and Landfills: The Case of the 
Yankton Sioux, 43 S.D. L. REV. 283 (1998) for further discussion of this case. 
11. See, e.g., Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 329. See generally Royster, supra note 
10. 
12. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131 
(10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision). 
13. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677 
(10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, U.S. Nov. 15 (2010) (Mem). 
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mining in the checkerboard region adjacent to the Navajo 
Nation reservation and exemplify a natural resource conflict 
amplified by jurisdictional confusion. This comment argues 
that the courts in HRI III and Morris employ a backward-
looking approach to determine tribal jurisdiction, ignore the 
federal government’s trust responsibility to tribes and 
undermine the text and purpose of environmental statutes. In 
doing so, the courts write a new, troubling chapter in the 
Navajo Nation’s long history with uranium mining. To ensure 
that tribal lands offer “livable environments” for generations to 
come, consistent with congressional intent, this comment 
contends that federal agencies must (1) retain regulatory 
authority to ensure that tribes’ natural resources and their 
communities’ public health are adequately protected, and must 
(2) write “Indian Trust Impact Statements” to identify and 
mitigate potential harm to tribes’ natural resources. 
Part II of this comment presents and critiques the Tenth 
Circuit’s approach in HRI III and Morris to jurisdictional 
disputes, environmental protection under the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA) and the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and public health protection under the Atomic Energy 
Act (AEA). Part III examines the effect these decisions have on 
a Navajo community, on its environment and on democratic 
accountability to the tribal community. Part IV recommends 
first, that the federal government retain environmental 
regulatory authority over checkerboard areas; and second, that 
the federal government require agencies to write “Indian Trust 
Impact Statements” to clarify when a tribe’s trust assets will 
be affected and how the trust assets will be protected. In these 
ways, the federal government can avoid or defuse natural 
resource conflicts in checkerboard areas, fulfill its trust 
responsibility to tribes and ensure that federal environmental 
laws protect public health and the environment as Congress 
intended. 
II.  THE LEGAL AND LOCAL HISTORIES OF HRI III AND 
MORRIS 
Both HRI III and Morris involve Hydro Resources 
Incorporated (HRI), the Navajo Nation and its members, 
federal agencies and the State of New Mexico. As will be 
discussed in Part III.C, infra, the cases also raise crucial issues 
for similarly situated tribes and tribal communities across the 
country.  
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HRI is a groundwater development company that mines 
uranium through the in situ leach (ISL) uranium mining 
process14 and is a subsidiary of Texas-based, Uranium 
Resources, Inc. (URI).15 HRI owns 183,000 acres of land across 
seven sites in northwestern New Mexico on the boarder of the 
Navajo Nation reservation.16 This area is home to the largest 
known deposit of uranium in the country and one of the largest 
deposits of uranium in the world.17 HRI’s seven sites contain 
101.4 million pounds of mineralized uranium, of which its site 
in the Church Rock Chapter of the Navajo Nation holds more 
uranium than any other site.18 Specifically, HRI’s Church Rock 
site consists of two adjacent parcels of land in Sections 8 and 
17, which are surrounded by lands predominantly owned by 
tribal members, the tribe itself or the federal government in 
trust for tribal members.19 
The Navajo Nation occupies the largest reservation in the 
United States, spanning a 27,000 square mile area from 
southeastern Utah to northeastern Arizona to northwestern 
New Mexico.20 The Navajo Nation is home to more than 
                                                
14. Id. at 682 (explaining that in situ leach uranium mining is a recently developed 
uranium extraction method which requires injecting lixiviant, groundwater charged 
with oxygen and bicarbonate, into a well field and flushing out the uranium ore). 
According to the U.S. Geological Survey, “the use of these in-situ leach mining 
techniques at uranium mines is considerably more environmentally benign than 
traditional mining and milling of uranium ore. Nonetheless, the use of leaching fluids 
to mine uranium contaminates the groundwater aquifer in and around the region from 
which the uranium is extracted.” J.A. DAVIS, G.P. CURTIS, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
NUREG/CR – 6870, CONSIDERATION OF GEOCHEMICAL ISSUES IN GROUNDWATER 
RESTORATION AT URANIUM IN-SITU LEACH MINING FACILITIES  V (2007), available at 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0706/ML070600405.pdf. See HRI’s website for an 
overview of the company’s capabilities, http://www.hydroresources.com/index.html 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2011). 
15. URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2010). 
16. See generally URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 4, 24–35 (2010), 
available at http://www.uraniumresources.com/projects/newmexico.html for a detailed 
description of URI’S operations, maps of mining sites, financial status forecast, legal 
and financial risks and litigation. 
17. LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS, URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT  
(2010). 
18. URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2010). 
19. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131, 
1136–7 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision); Morris v. United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677, 683 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, U.S. 
Nov. 15 (2010) (Mem). 
20. See History, OFFICIAL SITE OF THE NAVAJO NATION, http://www.navajo-
nsn.gov/history.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2011). 
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175,228 Navajo people21 for whom the environment remains a 
defining element of their identity, life ways, spirituality, 
economy and future wellbeing.22 The Church Rock Chapter is 
located in the eastern portion of the Navajo Nation, which is 
central to Navajos’ origins and spirituality.23 Ninety-eight 
percent of residents in the Church Rock Chapter are Navajo24 
and eighty-eight percent of the land surrounding HRI’s parcel 
is owned by the Tribe, tribal members or held in trust for the 
Tribe.25 
For HRI to mine uranium at the Church Rock site, it needed 
a permit under the SDWA to allow its injection of fluid 
contaminants in to the groundwater,26 as well as a “source 
materials license”27 under the AEA to possess, process and 
transport uranium.28 As a result of the Tenth Circuit’s 
                                                
21. U.S. CENSUS, 2000, Population Living on Selected Reservations, Trust Lands and 
Alaska Native Areas, http://www.census.gov/ (search “population of Navajo Nation,” 
then follow hyperlink to Population Living on Selected Reservations and Trust Lands) 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2011). 
22. A. The four sacred elements of life, air, light/fire, water and earth/pollen in all 
their forms must be respected, honored and protected for they sustain life; . . .  D. 
The Diné have a sacred obligation and duty to respect, preserve and protect all 
that was provided for we were designated as the steward of these relatives 
through our use of the sacred gifts of language and thinking; and E. Mother Earth 
and Father Sky is part of us as the Diné and the Diné is part of Mother Earth and 
Father Sky; . . . F. The rights and freedoms of the people to the use of the sacred 
elements of life as mentioned above and to the use of the land, natural resources, 
sacred sites and other living beings must be accomplished through the proper 
protocol of respect and offering and these practices must be protected and 
preserved for they are the foundation of our spiritual ceremonies and the Diné life 
way; and G. It is the duty and responsibility of the Diné to protect and preserve 
the beauty of the natural world for future generations. 
1 Navajo Nation Code, Section 205, Nahasdzáán dóó Yádiłhił Bitsąądęę 
Beenahaz’áanii-Diné Natural Law (2002) http://www.navajocourts.org/Resolutions/CN-
69-02Dine.pdf. See also Rebecca Tsosie, supra note 7, at 268–302 for a discussion of the 
intersection of the natural, spiritual, cultural and economic realms as they influence 
tribal environmental policy in several American Indian communities. 
23. PETER IVERSON, DINÉ: A HISTORY OF THE NAVAJOS at 10–11, University of New 
Mexico Press (2002). 
  24. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1169 (Ebel, J., dissenting).  
25. Id. at 1168, 1180. See discussion of the physical, social and political make-up of 
the Church Rock Chapter in Part II.A.3 infra. 
26. See Application for a [Underground Injection Control] permit; authorization by 
permit, 40 C.F.R. § 144.31 (2006); see also Criteria for establishing permitting 
priorities, 40 C.F.R. § 146.9. 
27. Definitions, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(z) (2006) (“The term “source material” means (1) 
uranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the Commission . . . 
to be source material; or (2) ores . . .”). 
28. See License requirements for transfers, 42 U.S.C. § 2092 (2006); General 
requirements for issuance of specific licenses, 10 C.F.R. § 40.32 (2006).    
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decisions in HRI III and Morris, HRI overcame two major 
obstacles obstructing its ability to mine uranium at Church 
Rock. In HRI III, the court determined that because HRI’s land 
in Section 8 was not within Indian country, the State of New 
Mexico, not the federal Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), had authority to permit HRI’s activities under the 
SDWA.29 In Morris, the court upheld the source materials 
license granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 
(NRC) to HRI.30 
To evaluate the HRI III and Morris decisions and the 
alternative outcomes that were available to the Tenth Circuit, 
it is critical to understand the history of courts’ “dependent 
Indian community” doctrine,31 land ownership in the Church 
Rock Chapter and uranium mining involving the Navajo 
Nation. Following this history, this section analyzes the Tenth 
Circuit’s decisions and motivations for its decisions in HRI III 
and Morris. 
A.  Hydro Resources, Inc. v. United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (HRI III): Jurisdiction in Dependent 
Indian Communities 
In HRI III, the court considered which sovereign—the 
Navajo Nation, the State of New Mexico or the EPA—had the 
authority under the SDWA to permit HRI’s ISL uranium 
mining project on Section 8 of the Church Rock Chapter of the 
Navajo Nation.32 This question turned on whether HRI’s land 
was within a “dependent Indian community” and therefore 
constituted “Indian country.” If Section 8 was Indian country, 
the land would fall within federal, and potentially tribal, 
jurisdiction.33 The court’s answer to this question would 
determine the future of HRI-URI’s future in uranium mining,34 
                                                
29. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131, 
1166 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision). 
30. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677, 705 
(10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, U.S. Nov. 15 (2010) (Mem). 
31. Dependent Indian communities are one category of Indian country as defined by 
18 U.S.C § 1151(b) and discussed in Part II.A.1–2 infra. 
32. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1134. 
 33. See Indian Tribes, 40 C.F.R. §§ 145.52, 145.56, 145.58 (2006) (tribes are eligible 
to apply for primary enforcement of the Underground Injection Control Program 
within the area of the tribal government’s jurisdiction). 
34. URI’s financial future is precarious. Its 2010 Annual Report warns: 
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the extent of New Mexico’s regulatory authority and the 
Church Rock community’s air and water quality. The evolution 
of courts’ interpretations of “dependent Indian community” 
was central to the Tenth Circuit’s decision that HRI’s land was 
not part of a dependent Indian community. This comment 
argues that the court’s opinion was motivated by an “allotment 
era” perspective and a preference for administrative 
expedience. 
1.  The Genesis of Dependent Indian Communities 
Indian country defines the area within which a tribe’s laws 
and customs, and federal laws relating to tribes and tribal 
members generally govern, as distinct from state law.35 Indian 
country is most often defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151,36 commonly 
referred to as the “Indian country statute.” According to that 
statute, Indian country is recognized in three areas: 
reservations,37 dependent Indian communities,38 and Indian 
allotments.39 The dependent Indian communities portion of the 
                                                
[w]e are not producing uranium at this time, nor do we expect to begin production 
in the near future unless uranium prices recover to sustained profitable levels. As 
a result, we currently have no sources of operating cash. If we cannot monetize 
certain existing Company assets, partner with another Company that has cash 
resources, . . . or have the ability to access additional sources of private or public 
capital we may not be able to remain in business . . . We do not have a committed 
source of financing for the development of our New Mexico Properties, including 
the Churchrock Property, which is the property we expect to develop first in New 
Mexico.” 
URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 10–14 (2010). 
35. See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571–72 (1883) (federal laws are not 
applicable to Indian country unless Congress so expressly legislates); Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community 
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of 
Georgia can have not force.”). 
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 is found within the criminal code, however, jurisdiction under 
the statute  can also extend to the civil context. See California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 n.5 (1987). 
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2006) (“[t]he term “Indian country” . . . means (a) all land 
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including the rights-of-
way running through the reservation”). 
38. Id. § 1151(b) (“[t]he term “Indian country” . . . means (b) all dependent Indian 
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or 
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a 
state”). 
39. Id. § 1151(c) (“[t]he term “Indian country” . . . means (c) all Indian allotments, 
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running 
through the same”). 
9
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statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b), at issue in HRI III, codified two 
Supreme Court cases—United States v. Sandoval40 
(recognizing the Santa Clara Pueblo as a dependent Indian 
community) and United States v. McGowan41 (recognizing the 
Reno Indian Colony as a dependent Indian community). 
In both Sandoval and McGowan, the Court looked to the 
purpose of the applicable statute to determine whether 
Congress had intended to recognize a dependent Indian 
community. In Sandoval, the Court focused on the purpose of a 
federal liquor law to protect Indian people from non-Indians’ 
exploitive sales to Indian people, and the federal government’s 
treatment of the Pueblo—its provision of agricultural 
implements, irrigation and education to the people.42 The 
Court also found the fact that Pueblo lands were not held in 
trust by the federal government, but by the people in 
communal fee simple, did not preclude recognition of the 
Pueblo as a dependent Indian community.43 Finally, the Court 
affirmed Congress’ authority to determine Indian country 
status, as opposed to the courts, and patently rejected the 
notion that any community would be labeled an Indian tribe, 
but rather, only “distinctly Indian communities.”44 
In McGowan, the Court introduced a rule to determine 
dependent Indian country status: whether the land had been 
“validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the 
superintendence of the government.”45 The majority of the 
Court’s discussion reviews Congress’ intent to set aside a 
homeland for displaced Indian people in Nevada and the 
federal government’s similar treatment of the Indian Colony to 
other reservations.46 In addition, the Court approached the 
issue of Indian country status flexibly: “[w]e must consider ‘the 
changes which have taken place in our situation, with a view 
of determining from time to time what must be regarded as 
Indian country,’”47 and within the context of the federal 
                                                
40. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). 
41. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938). 
42. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 39–42. 
43. Id. at 48. 
44. Id. at 46. 
45. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 537 citing Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 561 (1883). 
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government’s long-standing relationship with Indians.48 
2.  Courts’ Evolving Interpretation of Dependent Indian 
Communities 
After the enactment of the Indian country statute in 1948, 
courts recognized a third category of dependent Indian 
communities (in addition to Pueblos and Indian colonies)—
those that exist outside the boundaries of a reservation.49 
Dependent Indian communities located outside the exterior 
boundaries of reservations are the product of  allotment era 
policy from the 1880s to the 1920s. During that time, Congress 
allotted land to individual Indians on and off reservations in 
an effort to assimilate Indians into agricultural society.50 
Subsequently, many allotments were transferred lawfully and 
unlawfully into non-Indian ownership, resulting in a total loss 
of 150 million acres of land to Indian tribes.51 In addition, 
Congress restored some of the remaining reservation land that 
had not been allotted to “public domain” and sold it to non-
Indian homesteaders.52  
In jurisdictional disputes since the allotment era, many 
courts have diminished Indian reservations’ original 
boundaries established by treaties and executive orders.53 In 
this way, allotment resulted in “checkerboard” land ownership 
on and off reservations where land parcels may be owned by 
the tribe, by individual Indians, by the federal government in 
trust for the tribe, or by private, non-Indian owners.54 In cases 
                                                
48. Id. at 539 (“[w]hen we view the facts of this case in the light of the relationship 
which has long existed between the government and the Indians-and which continues 
to date-it is not reasonably possible to draw any distinction between this Indian 
‘colony’ and “Indian country.’”). 
49. Robert T. Anderson et al., supra note 3, at 194. 
50. See id. at 77–78. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 77–79 (explaining that by 1934, tribes retained only forty-eight million acres, 
down from 156 million acres in 1881, the end of the treaty making era). See also 
Douglas Nash & Eric Eberhard, Forward at the Seattle University Symposium, 
Perspectives on Tribal Land Acquisition, 23–24 (Jun. 3, 2010) (transcript available in 
the Seattle University School of Law Library) (explaining that prior to the arrival of 
Europeans, Indian tribes occupied 1.9 billion acres in North America). 
53. Compare Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 472 (1984) (concluding that Congress 
did not intend to diminish the reservation), with South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 
522 U.S. 329, 358 (1998) (concluding that Congress intended to diminish the 
reservation). 
54. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131, 
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involving disputes in such checkerboard areas adjacent to 
reservations, courts must often determine dependent Indian 
community status.55 As a result, dependent Indian 
communities are recognized on an ad hoc basis without an 
official method to quickly confirm their status. In addition, 
because federal agencies are most familiar with tribal 
authority on reservations,56 they sometimes view dependent 
Indian communities as anomalous and problematic.57 As 
illustrated below, the absence of a modern dependent Indian 
community statute leaves communities in checkerboard areas 
adjacent to reservations subject to the shifting winds of federal 
common law. 
Over twenty years after the passage of the Indian country 
statute, United States v. Martine was the first case to construe 
18 U.S.C. § 1151(b).58 In that case, the Tenth Circuit construed 
Sandoval’s “federal treatment of the Indian community” factor 
as requiring the court’s inquiry into “the nature of the area in 
question, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to 
Indian Tribes and to the federal government, and the 
established practice of government agencies toward the 
area.”59 As in Sandoval, the Martine court also assuaged any 
fear that dependent Indian community status would be 
recognized arbitrarily.60 
In Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Company v. 
Watchman,61 the court formalized Martine’s additional, 
community-specific factors into a two-step analysis to 
                                                
1136 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision). 
55. See, e.g., Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 
1542–46 (10th Cir. 1995) (outlining a multi-factor dependent Indian community 
analysis) (overruled in Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 
608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision)); United States v. Martine, 442 
F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971) (checkerboard area outside Navajo Reservation is a 
dependent Indian community). 
56. See generally HRI III, 608 F.3d 1131; see also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of 
Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985). 
57. See generally HRI III, 608 F.3d 1131. 
58. Martine, 442 F.2d at 1023. 
59. Id. at 1023. 
60. Id. at 1024 (“Appellant urges that such a holding implies that wherever a group 
of Indians is found, e.g., in Los Angeles, there is a dependent Indian community . . . 
The mere presence of a group of Indians in a particular area would undoubtedly not 
suffice.”). 
61. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1542–46 
(10th Cir. 1995). 
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determine dependent Indian community status. Though the 
Watchman analysis was partially rejected in Alaska v. Native 
Village of Venetie Tribal Government,62 lower courts’ continued 
to distinguish Venetie and applied parts of the Watchman 
analysis.63 This trend indicated courts’ understanding of the 
importance of community-specific factors to a proper 
determination of dependent Indian community status,64 the 
presumption in favor of the continued existence of Indian 
country65 and the requirement that congressional intent to 
terminate Indian country status must be clearly expressed.66 
In Watchman, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the 
Navajo Nation could impose a levy on source gains from 
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Company’s (P&M) coal 
mines located adjacent to the reservation.67 The lands at issue 
in Watchman are typical of checkerboard areas. P&M shared 
its ownership interest in the surface estate with the Tribe, 
Tribal allottees, the State of New Mexico and the federal 
government. P&M shared its coal estate with the federal 
government, the State of New Mexico and the Cerillos Land 
                                                
62. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t (Venetie), 522 U.S. 520 
(1998) (overruling Watchman’s multi-factor analysis and replacing it with a two-step 
bright-line rule). 
63. Despite Venetie’s partial dismissal of the Watchman test, some courts 
distinguished Venetie and continued to apply Watchman’s “community of reference 
test.” See United States v. Arrieta, 436 F.3d 1246, 1250–52 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying 
Watchman’s “community of reference test” to an entire Pueblo (not only the road in 
question) before applying Venetie’s two-pronged rule); Garcia v. Gutierrez, 217 P.3d 
591, 599–600 (N.M. 2009) (holding that the fee land in question is “Indian country” for 
the purpose of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act because § 
1151(b) does not determine civil jurisdiction, and therefore, Venetie does not apply); 
State v. Romero, 142 P.3d 887, 891–93 (N.M. 2006) (applying Watchman’s “community 
of reference” test and holding that non-Indian fee land within the exterior boundaries 
of a Pueblo is part of a dependent Indian community); but see State v. Frank, 52 P.3d 
404, 407–10 (N.M. 2002) (adopting Venetie); Thompson v. Franklin, 127 F. Supp.2d 
145, 156–159 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (adopting Venetie). 
64. But see Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 
1131, 1156 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision) (noting that “[n]othing in Sandoval 
or McGowan suggests that the metes and bounds of “dependent Indian communities” 
should be determined by a court’s perceptions about local social, political or geographic 
affinities). 
65. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430  U.S. 584, 594 (1977); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 
187 U.S. 553, 556–68 (1903). 
66. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998). 
67. See, e.g., Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 
1534 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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Company.68 
Watchman largely concretized the dependent Indian 
community tests courts had used for the past twenty years.69 
The first part of the Watchman two-step analysis requires 
courts to locate the relevant “community of reference.”70 The 
Watchman court rejected the district court’s narrow definition 
of the community of reference as the mine site (excluding the 
surrounding area) noting, “the existence of a dependent Indian 
community does not depend on the relative size of the 
geographical area.”71 Building upon Martine’s precedent, the 
second step of the Watchman test considers:72 (1) whether the 
United States retained title to the lands; (2) the relationship of 
the residents to the Tribe and the federal government; (3) 
whether the area demonstrates cohesiveness; and (4) whether 
the lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy and 
protection of the dependent Indian peoples.73 
In Venetie,74 the United States Supreme Court partially 
replaced Watchman’s analysis of a community’s social, physical 
and legal contours with a bright-line rule. Under Venetie’s two-
step test, a dependent Indian community’s land must (1) have 
been set aside by the federal government for the benefit of 
Indians, and (2) the federal government must provide 
sufficient superintendence over the land.75 In Venetie, because 
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act extinguished tribes’ 
aboriginal title and enabled non-Indians to own former 
                                                
68. Id. at 1534–36. 
69. See, e.g., United States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885 (D.S.D. 1991) (holding that a 
dependent Indian community exists where homes were built with federal funds and 
preferences for leasing were given to tribal members satisfied the “federal set aside” 
requirement and the provision of tribal services in the housing community satisfied 
the “cohesiveness” requirement); Mound v. Spotted Horse, 477 F. Supp. 156, 160 
(D.S.D. 1979) (applying a four-factor analysis similar to Watchman); United States v. 
Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (1971) (examining the area in question, the relationship 
between the tribal community, the tribe and the federal government, and federal 
agencies’ treatment of the community). 
70. Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1542–43. 
71. Id. at 1543. 
72. Id. at 1546. 
73. Id. at 1545. 
74. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t (Venetie), 522 U.S. 520 (1998). 
75. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 530–31. Cf. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW 7 (1942) (defining dependent Indian communities as “any lands occupied by 
‘distinctly Indian communities’ recognized and treated by the Government as 
‘dependent communities’ entitled to protection”). 
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reservation land, the Village of Venetie failed to meet the 
federal set-aside requirement.76 In addition, the Court decided 
that the federal government’s provision of “health, social, 
welfare and economic programs,” did not amount to “federal 
superintendence”—a tribal-federal relationship the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act specifically sought to avoid.77 
Lower courts partially distinguished Venetie on two grounds. 
First, Venetie’s analysis turned on the distinct purpose of the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act to extinguish tribes’ 
aboriginal title and did not intend to address Indian country 
status in areas outside of Alaska, such as New Mexico’s 
Pueblos.78 Second, Venetie did not expressly discuss or overrule 
Watchman’s community of reference test.79 As a result, Venetie 
did not end debate regarding the “land in question” from which 
to begin the dependent Indian community analysis.80 For 
instance, in United States v. Arrieta81 and State v. Romero,82 
the courts looked to the larger Pueblo as the relevant “land in 
question,” and held that a county road and privately-owned fee 
land, respectively, were part of dependent Indian communities 
due to their location within or between Pueblos.83 Despite the 
Supreme Court’s best efforts, dependent Indian communities 
defy simple designation. 
3.  The Landscape of Navajo Nation’s Church Rock Chapter 
Federal land policy left an indelible mark on land status in 
the Church Rock Chapter. During the late nineteenth century, 
the federal government granted railroad companies 
                                                
76. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 533. 
77. Id. at 533–34. 
78. See Romero, 142 P.3d at 891 (N.M. 2006); Garcia v. Gutierrez, 217 P.3d 591, 
599–600 (N.M. 2009). 
79. See United States v. Arrieta, 436 F.3d 1246, 1249–51 (10th Cir. 2006) (state 
highway right-of-way within the exterior boundaries of a Pueblo, surrounded on both 
sides by non-Indian fee land, falls within a dependent Indian community); Romero, 
142 P.3d at 891–95 (non-Indian owned fee lands within a Pueblo fall within a 
dependent Indian community). 
80. Hydro Res. Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI I), 198 F.3d 1224, 
1249 (10th 2000) (rev’d on other grounds, HRI III, 608 F.3d 1331 (2010) (en banc 6-5 
decision)) . 
81. Arrieta, 436 F.3d at 1250–51. 
82. Romero, 142 P.3d at 887. 
83. Arrieta, 436 F.3d at 1249–51; Romero, 142 P.3d at 891–95. 
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alternating parcels of land adjacent to the reservation.84 When 
it became clear that private, non-Indian landowners were 
appropriating scarce water resources, the government changed 
course and added land to the reservation, while preserving 
existing non-Indian property rights.85 In 1911, the government 
changed course again, opening unallotted lands for sale to the 
public.86 In 1928, Congress reversed course once again, 
purchasing former railroad tracts to be held in trust for the 
benefit of the Navajo.87 In this way, the federal government’s 
land policies caused extreme checkerboarding in the Church 
Rock Chapter and created the jurisdictional quagmire the HRI 
III court sought to reconcile. 
Of the Church Rock Chapter’s 57,000 acres, the federal 
government holds fifty-two percent in trust for the Navajo 
Nation and twenty-six percent in trust for individual Indians.88 
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) owns ten percent of 
the land, subject to grazing permits granted to Navajos.89 
Thus, the federal government owns a total of eighty-eight 
percent of the land used or occupied by Navajos.90 Of the 
remaining land, private landowners own six percent and the 
State of New Mexico owns four percent.91 
The Chapter is divided into sections, of which HRI owns one 
parcel in Section 8 in fee and owns subsurface rights to the 
adjacent parcel in Section 17 (the locus of the dispute in 
Morris).92 Together, HRI’s two parcels contain 7.8 tons of 
uranium—nearly a quarter of its total uranium holdings in 
New Mexico.93 HRI’s 160 acre parcel is located in the southeast 
quadrant of Section 8, adjacent to the southern and eastern 
                                                
84. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1136. 





90. Id. at 1168, 1180 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (noting that land ownership estimates are 
precise within 2.4 percent). The HRI II court estimated federal ownership to be ninety-
two percent of land in the Chapter. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 562 F.3d 1249, 1267 (10th Cir. 2009). 
91. Id. at 1168 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
92. Id. at 1157; Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677, 
705 (10th  Cir. 2010). 
93. URANIUM RESOURCES, INC., http://www.uraniumresources.com (last visited Jan. 
27, 2011). 
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boundaries of Navajo Nation’s reservation.94 The neighboring 
three quadrants in Section 8 are held in trust for  Navajo 
whose grazing permits there span multiple contiguous 
sections.95 Section 8 also sits above the Westwater Canyon 
Aquifer, which provides potable water to approximately 12,000 
people living in the eastern half of the reservation.96 The 
aquifer meets primary Safe Drinking Water Act SDWA 
standards.97 
The Navajo Nation and the federal government dominate 
economic, political and cultural life of the Church Rock 
Chapter. In 1927, the Bureau of Indian Affairs divided the 
Navajo tribal government into Chapters, which were later 
certified by the Tribe and approved by the Department of the 
Interior (DOI).98 The Chapter House, built by local Navajo in 
1946, is the social and political center of the Chapter and offers 
a Head Start program, an elementary school, churches, and 
other social and health facilities.99 Of the Chapter’s 2,802 
residents, ninety-eight percent are Navajo, and eighty-eight 
percent of residents frequent the Chapter House at least once a 
month.100 
“The Navajo Nation provides housing, electricity, drinking 
water, wastewater treatment, sewer services and utilities, as 
well as police protection to the residents of the Chapter, and 
the Chapter itself provides scholarships, home repair and 
                                                
94. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1136–39 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
95. Id. at 1168–69 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (noting Section 8’s integration with 
surrounding land sections). 
96. Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change, Sustainability and Globalization: Charting the 
Future of Indigenous Environmental Self-Determination, 4 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & 
POL’Y J. 188, 224 (2009); Southwest Research and Information Center, Facts and 
History About: HRI’s Crownpoint Uranium Solution Mining Project, 
http://www.sric.org/uranium/CUPstat.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). 
97. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1161, 1179 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (noting that Westwater 
Canyon water is “outstanding”); Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 10 Morris v. 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 
WL 4732316 at 16 (noting that according to the final environmental impact statement, 
water from the Westwater Canyon Aquifer meets New Mexico’s drinking water 
standards). 
98. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1137; EPA’s Supplemental Brief for the En Banc Court at 28 
n. 18 Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131 
(2010) (No. 07-9506), 2009 WL 3375299. 
99. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1169 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
100. Id. 
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purchase assistance, and meals for seniors.”101 The federal 
government provides road maintenance, grazing management 
and social and health services.102 Finally, the local 
Superintendent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs asserted that 
the Navajo people living in the Chapter rely “primarily” upon 
federal and tribal services.103 McKinley County, in which the 
Church Rock Chapter is located, “provides essential public 
services to [the] private lands,” which comprise six percent of 
Church Rock Chapter; HRI pays annual property taxes on its 
land to the County.104 
4.  The HRI III Decision 
The jurisdictional dispute over HRI’s land began in 1988 
when HRI applied to the State of New Mexico for a permit to 
begin uranium mining.105 HRI assumed that because its 
proposed operation was on private land, it should seek a 
SDWA permit from the State of New Mexico106 under the 
State’s Underground Injection Control (UIC) program.107 
Because HRI’s land was surrounded by trust lands, however, 
the EPA argued that the site fell within a “dependent Indian 
communit[y].”108 Prior to HRI III, the Tenth Circuit held in 
HRI II, that Section 8 was part of a dependent Indian 
community.109 HRI petitioned for en banc review, contending 
that Venetie had eliminated Watchman’s “community of 
reference” test employed in HRI II.110 In HRI III, the court 
considered the validity of the EPA’s Land Status 
Determination, in which the EPA affirmed Section 8’s status 
as a dependent Indian community.111 Reversing its decision 
from the previous year in HRI II, the en banc court vacated the 




104. Id. at 1137. 
105. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677, 
681–682 (10th Cir. 2010). 
106. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1169 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
107. Id. at 1139–40. 
108. Id. at 1142–44. 
109. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI II), 562 F.3d 1249, 
1267 (10th Cir. 2009). 
110. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1135. 
111. Id. at 1142–43. 
18
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol1/iss2/4
370 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:2 
 
EPA’s Land Status Determination and held that Section 8 did 
not meet the requirements of a dependent Indian community 
after all.112 
By holding that Venetie had eliminated the “community of 
reference” test, the HRI III court narrowed the scope of its 
dependent Indian community analysis and decided that the 
appropriate “land in question” was HRI’s land parcel, in 
isolation from the rest of Section 8 and the Chapter.113 
Although the Venetie Court did not address the community of 
reference issue or the status of non-Indian fee land in 
dependent Indian communities,114 the HRI III court 
determined that the community of reference test had been 
eliminated and that HRI’s parcel was the appropriate “land in 
question.”115 
The HRI III court then examined HRI’s parcel in terms of 
Venetie’s federal set-aside and federal superintendence tests. 
Because HRI’s land was held in fee-simple, the court decided 
the land was not “set-aside” for Indians.116 The court’s 
interpretation of the “set-aside” requirement depends solely on 
land title, despite Supreme Court precedent stating that the 
status of dependent Indian communities should be analyzed in 
the light most favorable to its Indian inhabitants,117 and that 
“Congress has defined Indian country broadly.”118 When the 
court isolates its analysis to HRI’s parcel, only HRI’s taxes to 
McKinley County and the County’s maintenance of a road to 
Section 8 is relevant, while federal superintendence of eighty-
                                                
112. Id. at 1166. 
113. Id. at 1149. 
114. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI I), 198 F.3d 1224, 
1241 (10th Cir. 2000) (rev’d on other grounds, HRI III, 608 F.3d 1331 (2010) (en banc 
6-5 decision)). 
115. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1152–53. 
116. Id. at 1148–49. 
117. In McGowan, one of two cases on which 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) is premised, the 
Court stated, “[w]hen we view the facts of this case in the light of the relationship 
which has long existed between the government and the Indians-and which continues 
to date it is not reasonably possible to draw any distinction between this Indian 
‘colony’ and ‘Indian country.’” United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938). 
118. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n. v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125 (1993). See also 
Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 457 (1989) (3-2-3 opinion) (“[O]nce the tribe’s 
valid regulatory interest is established, the nature of land ownership does not 
diminish the tribe’s inherent power to regulate in the area.”). 
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eight percent of the surrounding land becomes insignificant.119  
In dissent, Judge Ebel joined by four other judges stated, “it 
is difficult to imagine a situation in which a piece of property 
owned in fee by a private individual, examined in isolation 
from the community in which the parcel of land is located 
could meet these two criteria.”120 By adopting Venetie, the 
court significantly altered its reading of prior dependent 
Indian community doctrine. 
5.  Critique of the Court’s Reasoning  
The Tenth Circuit’s decision that HRI’s parcel in Section 8 is 
not part of a dependent Indian community is erroneous for 
three reasons: (1) the court misinterpreted the Indian country 
statute; (2) the court overstepped Supreme Court precedent set 
out in Venetie and misread subsequent case law; and (3) the 
court undermined the historic approach and current federal 
policy governing jurisdiction in Indian country. The court’s 
reasoning also proceeds from three flawed assumptions: that 
Indian country can expand uncontrollably; that the Watchman 
test was “outcome determinative;” and that a title-
determinative approach to dependent Indian communities will 
advance the goal of administrative expedience. 
First, by tying dependent Indian community status to land 
title, the HRI III court misinterprets the Indian country 
statute by reading the term “community” out of the statute. 
Sections 1151(a) (Indian reservations) and 1151(c) (Indian 
allotments) of the Indian county statutes pecifically reference 
land title, however, 1151(b) (dependent Indian communities) 
does not.121 This difference demonstrates that Congress 
understood the importance of land title and intentionally 
                                                
119. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1169. 
120. Id. at 1173 n.3 (Ebel, J., dissenting). See Judith V. Royster, Decontextualizing 
Federal Indian Law: The Supreme Court’s 1997-998 Term, 34 TULSA L.J. 329, 342–43 
(1999) (concluding that Venetie “all-but require[s] trust status for lands to be 
considered a dependent Indian community”). 
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1151 (“[t]he term “Indian country”, . . . means (a) all land within the 
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including the rights-of-
way running through the reservation,” (b) all dependent Indian communities within 
the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired 
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state,” (c) all Indian 
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-
way running through the same.”). 
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exempted land title from the definition of a dependent Indian 
community. Not only does the court’s interpretation render the 
word “community” superfluous, contrary to traditional 
methods of statutory interpretation,122 it effectively negates 
recognition of any dependent Indian community that is not a 
Pueblo or “Indian colony.”123 Aside from Pueblos, in the Tenth 
Circuit, going forward, Indian allotments are likely the only 
areas of “Indian country” that can exist outside of a 
reservation. 
The HRI III court’s title-determinative approach to 
dependent Indian communities rests on the assumption that 
such an approach will promote “administrative simplicity.”124 
According to the court, Venetie rightfully replaced Watchman’s 
community of reference test because it “ensure[s] that the 
boundaries of dependent Indian communities will be precisely 
and predictably defined.”125 The court reasons that because 
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as a criminal statute, 
predictability to ensure “fair warning” is of the highest 
importance.126 Yet, as the dissent points out, subtracting slices 
of private land from Indian country causes jurisdiction to 
alternate every few acres, which will increase confusion among 
law enforcement agents, rather than advancing administrative 
expedience.127 If checkerboard lands created the jurisdictional 
complexity that led to the instant dispute, perpetuating 
checkerboarding defies logic.128 Finally, the court promotes 
administrative expedience primarily for HRI’s benefit: 
“[S]imple jurisdictional rules . . . promote greater predictability 
[, which] is valuable to corporations making business and 
                                                
122. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1170 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
123. Id. at1170–72. 
124. Id. at 1159. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 1160. 
127. Id. at 1172–73 (Ebel, J., dissenting); EPA’s Supplemental Brief for the En Banc 
Court at 9–14 Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 
1131 (2010) (No. 07-9506), 2009 WL 3375299.  See Garcia v. Gutierrez, 217 P.3d 597, 
602 (N.M. 2009) (“In the criminal context, Section 1151’s ‘Indian country’ designation 
provides necessary homogenizing force, creating uniformity out of the sometimes 
chaotic jumble of land titles on, near, and within tribal boundaries.”); Seymour v. 
Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962) (holding 
that Congress’s intent in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1151 was to avoid checkerboard 
jurisdiction). 
128. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1173–74 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
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investment decisions.”129 In the end, the HRI III court’s title-
determinative approach misinterprets § 1151(b) and is 
motivated by the false assumption that that approach will lead 
to greater administrative expedience. 
Second, HRI III’s title-determinative approach oversteps 
Supreme Court precedent set out in Venetie and misreads 
subsequent case law.130 If the Sandoval Court had employed a 
title-determinative approach, it could not have recognized 
Pueblos as a dependent Indian community.131 In addition, the 
Venetie court did not explain how courts should determine to 
which land the two-step test should be applied.132 And, 
contrary to HRI III, the Venetie Court examined the entire 
Native Village of Venetie, not only the land from which the 
dispute arose.133 The Venetie court did not purport to address 
anything other than the status of lands held by Native villages 
in Alaska under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 
much less dependent Indian communities adjacent to 
reservations.134  
Finally, although the HRI III court’s decision formally rests 
on land title in isolation from other community-specific facts, 
the court found compelling that HRI’s parcel in Section 8 was 
                                                
129. Id. at 1160 n.23 (alterations in original) (quoting Hertz Corp v. Friend, ___ U.S. 
___, 130 S.Ct 1181, 1193 (2010)). 
130. See also Royster, supra note 120 (arguing that Venetie shifted the 18 U.S.C. § 
1151 doctrine dramatically and unnecessarily). 
131. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913). 
132. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1175 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
133. Id. at 1170–72 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (“One would therefore expect, if it were 
following the [HRI III] majority’s analysis, that the Venetie Court would have narrowly 
considered whether just the land on which the school was to be built was a dependent 
Indian community. But the Court decidedly did not do so. Instead, the Court in Venetie 
looked at all of the land that previously composed the Venetie Reservation-not just the 
site of the proposed school-to determine whether that land constituted a dependent 
Indian community. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523, 118 S.Ct. 948.” (emphasis in original)). 
134. See State v. Romero, 142 P.3d 887, 891 (N.M. 2006) (noting that in deciding 
Venetie, the Supreme Court had “specific Alaskan facts in mind” and that Venetie did 
not consider “the unique circumstances of New Mexico’s Pueblos”). The HRI III court 
criticizes Watchman’s community of reference test is “outcome determinative” in favor 
of tribes. (See HRI III 608 F.3d at 1154). Ironically, the Venetie test is similarly 
“outcome determinative” because a court must first determine to which land it will 
apply the two-step test. A court’s discretionary selection of the “land in question” is a 
normative, rather than an objective, process. For example, will a court choose to look 
at the entire scope of tribal lands, as in Venetie and Arrieta? Or will a court restrict its 
examination to the discrete parcel being claimed? (See Alaska v. Native Village of 
Venetie Tribal Gov’t (Venetie), 522 U.S. 520, 521–22, 534 (1998)). The  question, 
therefore, is how the court will conduct this normative analysis. 
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“rugged,” “isolated” and “uninhabited.”135 Yet, what percentage 
of Navajo land is “inhabited?” If land is rugged and isolated, it 
still may be valuable for activities other than resource 
extraction, such as grazing or harvesting traditional medicine, 
among other cultural and economic activities. The court’s 
assumption that valuable land must be inhabited reveals its 
pro-development bias and fails to recognize the value of 
Church Rock’s land in the eyes of ninety-eight percent of HRI’s 
neighbors.136 Thus, contrary to the court’s own preference for a 
title-determinative analysis, these community-specific factors 
creep into the majority’s analysis. 
Third, HRI III undermines the historic approach and 
current policies governing Indian country status. The HRI III 
court’s reasoning proceeds from an antiquated, allotment era 
perspective. Congress abandoned allotment policy and strove 
to mitigate its damage with the adoption of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 and Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act in 1975.137 As Judge Ebel’s dissent 
points out, the purpose of § 1151 was to avoid checkerboard 
jurisdiction, not further it.138 Indian law scholar, Dean Suagee, 
aptly notes that the “congressional intent of the allotment era 
                                                
135. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1138, 1143. 
136. Note that when courts diminish reservation boundaries, they do not hesitate to 
look at the “Indian character of the land” to make their determination. Compare Solem 
v. Bartlett 465 U.S. 463, 471–72, 480 (1984) (holding that after land was opened to 
settlement, the land had not lost its “Indian character,” but also “[w]hen an area is 
predominately populated by non-Indians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian 
allotments, finding that the land remains Indian country seriously burdens the 
administration of state and local governments.”) with Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 
420–21 (1994) (looking to the area’s eighty-five percent non-Indian population to find 
that the area had lost its Indian character). According to land ownership, population 
and service provision, the Church Rock Chapter has undeniably retained its “Indian 
character.” 
137. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Seattle University Symposium, Perspectives on Tribal 
Land Acquisition, 9 (Jun. 3, 2010) (transcript available in the Seattle University 
School of Law Library) (discussing the Indian Reorganization Act (25 U.S.C. § 465) as 
a recognition of the failure of the allotment era); Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–458 (2006). But see Brendale v. 
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 423 (1989) 
(noting that “[a]lthough the [IRA] may have ended the allotment of further lands, it 
did not restore to the Indians the exclusive use of those lands that had already passed 
to non-Indians…). 
138. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1172 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (noting that in Seymour v. 
Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358, the Supreme Court 
explicitly denounced “such an impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction” and 
that checkerboarding “was avoided by the plain language of § 1151.”). 
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should be irrelevant because during that era, there was no 
body of environmental protection law, and so Congress would 
not have given any thought to how allotment era legislation 
would affect the implementation of federal environmental 
laws.”139 In essence, employing an allotment era perspective in 
the resolution of modern tribal resource conflicts is analogous 
to applying Jim Crow laws to resolve modern racial zoning 
conflicts. Instead, courts should effectuate Indian self-
determination,140 according to which tribes may assume 
primary authority for environmental protection in their 
communities.141 
Lastly, the HRI III decision reflects Judge Frizzell’s lone 
dissent in HRI II. He cautioned that with the application of the 
community of reference test “we take an unprecedented step. 
Never before has non-Indian fee land outside the exterior 
boundaries of a reservation or Pueblo been held to be a 
dependent Indian community.”142 From Judge Frizzell’s 
perspective, the Watchman test was “outcome determinative,” 
Indian country threatens to grow uncontrollably, and it will 
inevitably encroach upon private, non-Indian land. The HRI 
III majority adopts this assumption, stating that “land that 
once wasn’t Indian country becomes Indian country by tribal 
preference or judicial decree rather than congressional 
action.”143 These statements are inaccurate. In fact, the courts 
have diminished reservation boundaries, wiping out large 
swaths of land formerly under tribal jurisdiction144 and tribes’ 
                                                
139. Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court’s “Whack-a-Mole” Game Theory in Federal 
Indian Law, a Theory that has No Place in the Realm of Environmental Law, 7 GREAT 
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 90, 112–14 (2002). 
140. There are numerous statutes which incorporate the “self-determination” model 
of tribal-federal relations. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–458 (2006) and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
1377 (2006). 
141. President Nixon, Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs 213 (Jul. 8, 
1970) (“We have concluded that Indians will get better programs and that public 
monies will be more effectively expended if the people who are most affected by these 
programs are responsible for operating them.”). See also discussion of EPA’s Indian 
Policy and “treatment as state” programs in Part III, infra; Rebecca Tsosie, supra note 
7 at 330 (“True environmental self-determination, however, depends upon the ability 
of Indian nations to preserve their landbases and engage in economic development 
according to their own policies and values.”). 
142. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1143 (quoting HRI II, 562 F.3d 1249, 1270–71 (10th Cir. 
2009) (Frizzell, J., dissenting in part)). 
143. Id. at 1153. 
144. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen v. 
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petitions to the Secretary of Interior to take land back into 
trust status are severely delayed or denied all together.145 
Furthermore, Sandoval146 and Martine147 specifically assuaged 
fear that tribal or Indian country status would be designated 
arbitrarily and directed that any change to dependent Indian 
community status must come from Congress, not the courts. 
The net effect of the HRI III court’s assumptions is to 
eliminate a sub-category of Indian country—dependent Indian 
communities located outside the exterior boundaries of a 
reservation.148 The court’s focus on land title obscures any 
consideration of Church Rock community’s legitimate concerns 
about the safety of its drinking water.149 Instead, as discussed 
in Part III infra, the HRI III court ensured that neither tribal 
government, state government, nor the federal government 
would be directly accountable to the Church Rock community. 
B.  Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
In Morris, the Tenth Circuit upheld the decision of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to grant a source 
materials license to HRI for its uranium mining operation on 
                                                
Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 414 (1994). 
145. In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act, which authorized DOI 
to take land into trust status under certain conditions. Conflict over DOI’s criteria for 
taking land into trust, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in Carcieri v. Salazar, 
555 U.S. 379 (2009), have severely complicated the process. See generally Amanda D. 
Hettler, Beyond A Carcieri Fix: The Need For Broader Reform of The Land-Into-Trust, 
96 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1387– 1391, (May, 2011). See also NATIONAL CONGRESS OF 
AMERICAN INDIANS, LAND INTO TRUST (2010) http://www.ncai.org/fileadmin/ncai_ 
events/2010_WH_Summit/2a_-_Land_into _trust_-_FINAL.pdf. 
146. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913). 
Of course it is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or body of 
people within the range of this power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe, 
but only that in respect of distinctly Indian communities, the question whether, to 
what extent, and for what time they shall be recognized and dealt with as 
dependent tribes requiring the guardianship and protection of the United States 
are to be determined by Congress, and not by the courts. 
Id. 
147. United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1971). 
148. See HRI III, 608 F.3d 1131, 1173 n.3 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (noting, “it is difficult 
to imagine a situation in which a piece of property owned in fee by a private 
individual, examined in isolation from the community in which the parcel of land is 
located could meet these two criteria”); Royster, supra note 130. 
149. Contra HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1179–81, 1184–86 (10th Cir. 2010) (Lucero J. and 
Henry J., dissenting) (noting the reliance of the Church Rock community on the 
Westwater Canyon Aquifer for drinking water and the likelihood that contamination 
from mining would endanger surrounding communities). 
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Section 17 land in the Church Rock Chapter of the Navajo 
Nation.150 The court made this decision despite radiation levels 
already above the public exposure limit and without certainty 
that HRI could restore contaminated groundwater to drinking 
water quality.151 In a two to one decision, the Tenth Circuit 
decided that because HRI’s uranium mining would only 
increase rates of radiation by a negligible amount, and because 
HRI would “likely” and “eventually” be able to restore the 
groundwater to some degree, NRC did not err in granting HRI 
a license to proceed with the mining.152 A brief review of the 
history of uranium mining in Navajo country provides the 
necessary context to the court’s decision. This review offers a 
single source for historical data otherwise found in various law 
review articles, congressional testimony and books. 
1.  The History of Uranium Mining and Its Impact on Navajo 
Country 
Since the 1940s, the United States and private companies 
have extracted large amounts of uranium from over 500 
uranium mines within the Navajo Nation.153 In 1975, the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights described the Navajo Nation as an 
“energy colony.”154 Despite some environmental remediation by 
the federal government, large amounts of mining tailings and 
waste remain exposed and compromise local air and water 
quality and the health of Church Rock Chapter’s residents.155 
a.  Strip Mining in Navajo Country 
In the Navajo Nation, the federal government found a 
favorable environment to seed its nuclear weapons program—a 
                                                
150. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677, 
705 (10th Cir. 2010). 
151. Id. at 691–694, 697, 700, 704. 
152. Id. 
153. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Wayne Nastri, Regional 
Administrator U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency – Region 9); Bradford Cooley, The Navajo 
Uranium Ban: Tribal Sovereignty v. National Energy Demands, 26 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393, 395 (2006). 
154. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Navajo Nation: An American Colony 
(1975), cited in Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of George Arthur, 
Chairman Resources Committee Navajo Nation Council). 
155. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Wayne Nastri, Regional 
Administrator U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency – Region 9); Cooley, supra note 153, at 395. 
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place rich in uranium, with few environmental, health and 
safety regulations, and a place with readily available, cheap 
labor close to the mineral source.156 Between 1944 and 1986, 
the government and private companies extracted nearly four 
million tons of uranium ore from over 500 mines in Navajo 
Country—all of which was blasted, hauled and processed by 
Navajo miners.157 By the 1960s, one half of all uranium miners 
in the country, roughly 1,500, were employed in New Mexico’s 
uranium mines.158 Many Navajo recall growing up in mining 
camps, drinking water and inhaling dust from poorly 
ventilated mines, while family members washed contaminated 
clothing and used mining implements at home.159 
Two factors significantly slowed states’ and the federal 
government’s response to known dangers surrounding 
uranium mining. First, although scientists had been aware of 
the link between uranium mining and low life expectancy 
among European miners since the sixteenth century, debate 
about the causal connection between the two continued 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century and stymied 
regulatory progress.160 Second, neither states nor the federal 
government assumed responsibility for establishing mine 
safety standards.161 In effect, the uranium boom came and 
went without the imposition of substantive safety standards to 
protect uranium miners or their families.162 One court noted 
that Utah, Arizona and New Mexico did “little or nothing” to 
improve conditions in their uranium mines.163 As a result, 
rates of exposure in some mines were one thousand times the 
maximum level recommended by the Public Health Service 
(PHS) and exceeded radiation doses from the atomic bombs in 
Japan.164 
                                                
156. Bradford Cooley, supra note 153 at 395. 
157. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Wayne Nastri, Regional 
Administrator U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency – Region 9); Cooley, supra note 153, at 395. 
158. Begay v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Ariz. 1984). 
159. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Phil Harrison, Navajo 
Nation Council Member). 
160. Begay, 591 F. Supp. at 991–92, 1005, 1011. 
161. Id. at 1001, 1009. 
162. In 1967, for the first time, the Secretary of Labor established safety and health 
standards for uranium mining. Id. at 1004, 1009. 
163. Id. at 1007. 
164. Id. 
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The single most devastating event occurred in 1979, several 
months after the accident at Three Mile Island, when a mud 
dam retaining uranium slurry burst.165 As a result, ninety-four 
million gallons of radioactive wastewater and 1100 tons of 
radioactive and toxic uranium waste entered the Puerco River, 
a main source of drinking water in Church Rock.166 Although 
the spill was far larger than that at Three Mile Island, the 
accident remains largely unknown, and its health effects are 
still unfolding.167 
Finally, in 1984, 200 Navajo miners sued several federal 
agencies for failing to warn them of the dangers of the 
uranium mining that they alleged caused them to contract 
various illnesses.168 Evidence indicated that PHS did not 
inform the miners of health risks associated with uranium 
mining because they were concerned about disrupting the 
work force and the potential difficulty of replacing workers 
given that the “fear of cancer . . . would seriously interrupt 
badly needed production of uranium.”169 When the court denied 
the miners’ claim,170 Congress adopted the Radiation Exposure 
Compensation Act in 1990.171 Obtaining actual compensation, 
however, has proven an uphill battle for many former Navajo 
miners.172 
b.  The Impact of Incomplete Remediation on Public Health 
and the Environment 
The federal government closed the Church Rock mine after 
                                                
165. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Doug Brugge, Professor 
of Public Health at Tufts University School of Medicine). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Begay, 591 F. Supp. at 993. 
169. Cooley, supra note 153 at 395 (quoting, Begay, 591 F. Supp. at 995). PHS 
decided not to warn miners of the potential radiation from uranium mining in order to 
ensure miners’ participation in the study and mine owners’ cooperation. Begay, 591 F. 
Supp. at 995. 
170. Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1059, 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 1985) (The court 
denied the miners’ claims because PHS’s decision not to warn the miners fell within 
the “discretionary function exception” of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
2680(a), which bars claims against the United States for acts or omissions of its 
employees that are discretionary, even when that discretion is abused.). 
171. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, 28 C.F.R. § 79 (2001). 
172. Compensation of Navajo Uranium Miners, WORLD INFORMATION SERVICE ON 
ENERGY, http://www.wise-uranium.org/ureca.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
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the United Nuclear Corporation abandoned it in 1982—before 
the company had undertaken environmental remediation.173 
The EPA has determined that the scope of environmental 
remediation in Navajo Country encompasses over 500 
abandoned uranium mines and 1000 potential remediation 
sites across an area the size of West Virginia.174 To date, the 
Department of Energy (DOE) has “decommissioned” four 
uranium processing sites.175 This process involves capping the 
mine shafts, containing tailings, posting public warning signs 
and remediating groundwater.176 
Although current environmental regulations require 
landfills to be lined to avoid groundwater contamination,177 
United Nuclear disposed of its mine waste by dumping soft 
tailings (slurry) into unlined ponds and by piling solid tailings 
beside each mine.178 As a result, mine tailings sit uncovered in 
unlined ponds and stand sixty to seventy feet tall. The 
consequences of these disposal practices are many. Dust from 
piles of mine tailings blow into nearby bodies of water, grazing 
lands and homes, carrying with it radiation from radon gas 
and toxic carcinogens.179 Consequently, Navajo livestock, 
which local residents consume and sell, are exposed to 
radiation and toxic substances as they graze amidst tailings 
                                                
173. See Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677, 
705 (10th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J., dissenting); Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 10 
Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-
9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 15. 
174. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Wayne Nastri, Regional 
Administrator U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency – Region 9). See Health and Environmental 
Impacts of Uranium Contamination in the Navajo Nation Five-Year Plan as Requested 
by H. Committee on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, U.S. ENTL. PROT. AGENCY, 4 (Jun. 9, 
2008), http://www.epa.gov/region9/superfund/navajo-nation/ (follow link to “Five Year 
Plan”). 
175. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Stephen Etsitty, 
Executive Director of the Navajo Nation Envtl. Prot. Agency). 
176. Id. 
177. Id. (statement of statement of Stephen Etsitty, Executive Director of the Navajo 
Nation Envtl. Prot. Agency and statement of George Arthur, Chairman Resources 
Committee Navajo Nation Council). 
178. Paul Robinson, Uranium Mill Tailings Remediation Performed by US DOE, SW. 
RESEARCH AND INFO. CENTER 9 (2004), available at http://www.vbgov.com 
/government/departments/public-utilities/Documents/08.DOE_Overview_Uranium 
_Tailing_Remediation.pdf. 
179. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Ray Manygoats and 
Edith Hood, Navajo tribal members). 
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piles and drink from slurry pools.180 In 2007, Church Rock 
residents testified in Congress that children play in tailings 
piles and suffer skin burns from contact with highly 
contaminated water.181 In addition, various cancers (including 
lung cancer, bone cancer, cancer of the sinuses, leukemia and 
skin cancer), kidney failure, miscarriages, lymphoma, birth 
defects, neurotoxicity, respiratory illnesses and skin diseases 
are frequent in neighboring Navajo communities.182 Medical 
researchers have traced these illnesses to gamma radiation, 
heavy metals and toxins associated with uranium mining 
waste.183 Finally, uranium mine tailings contain high levels of 
heavy metals such as selenium, molybdenum, cadmium, 
arsenic and lead, as well as chloride, nitrate, ammonia and 
sulfate that can seep into surface or groundwater and can 
contaminate drinking water.184 
While the federal government highlights the exorbitant cost 
of compensating former miners and of environmental 
remediation,185 it has “forgotten” uranium mining’s 
concomitant benefit to national security and the energy 
industry.186 Unfortunately, these benefits have come at a high 
cost to the Navajo people. 
c.  The Navajo Nation’s Moratorium on Uranium Mining and 
Community Remediation Efforts 
We are still undergoing what appears to be a never-
ending federal experiment to see how much devastation 
can be endured by a people . . . from exposure to 
radiation in the air, in the water, in the mines and on 
                                                
180. See id. (statement of Ray Manygoats, Navajo tribal member). 
181. See id. (statement of Phil Harrison, Navajo Nation Council Member and Edith 
Hood, Navajo tribal member). 
182. See id  (Stephen Etsitty, Executive Director of the Navajo Nation Envtl. Prot. 
Agency and Doug Brugge, Professor of Public Health at Tufts University School of 
Medicine). 
183. See id. (statement of Stephen Etsitty, Executive Director of the Navajo Nation 
Envtl. Prot. Agency and Doug Brugge, Professor of Public Health at Tufts University 
School of Medicine). See also Robinson, supra note 178, at 11–12; Cong. Hearing on 
Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of David Geiser, Deputy Director, Office of Legacy 
Management, Dep’t of Energy). 
184. Robinson, supra note 178, at 11. 
185. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Wayne Nastri, Regional 
Administrator U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency – Region 9). 
186. Begay v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 991, 1011 (D. Ariz. 1984). 
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the surface of the land. We are unwilling to be subjects 
of that ongoing experiment any longer.187 
In response to the Bush administration’s reinvigoration of 
America’s nuclear energy program,188 the Navajo Nation 
Council enacted the Diné Natural Resources Protection Act of 
2005.189 The Act places a moratorium on uranium mining “on 
any sites within Navajo Indian Country as defined by Title 7 of 
Navajo Nation Code Section 254 and 18 U.S.C. § 1151”190 and 
provides Navajos with the right to a healthy environment.191 
The Act also codifies traditional Navajo beliefs that warn 
against the disturbance of harmful substances.192 The 
moratorium is supported by a description of the cost of 
uranium mining to residents, including diminished work 
years, illness and death, the economic loss associated with 
unproductive land, diminished property value and 
contaminated livestock.193 Finally, the Act forecasts that 
“future [uranium] mining . . . will generate further economic 
detriments to the Navajo Nation,” including remediation costs, 
veterinary costs, loss of access to and use of vegetation and loss 
of potable water supplies.194 
In addition, when federal remediation efforts for uranium 
damages were slow to come, the Church Rock Uranium Mining 
Project (CRUMP), a community-based research, education and 
monitoring organization, began its own remediation effort to 
educate the local community and to advocate for 
comprehensive remediation.195 CRUMP’s documentation of 
                                                
187. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of George Arthur, 
Chairman, Resources Committee,  Navajo Nation Council member). 
188. See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16021–16025 (2006) 
(establishing the “Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project”). 
189. Diné Natural Resources Protection Act (DNRPA), 18 Navajo Nation Code §§ 
1301–1303 (2005). 
190. Id. § 1302(A). 
191. Id. § 1301(C) (“[i]t is the right and freedom of the people to be respected, 
honored and protected with a healthy physical and mental environment”). 
192. “[T]he people now know that uranium is one such substance and that its 
extraction should be avoided as traditional practice and prohibited by Navajo law.” Id. 
§ 1301(D). 
193. Id. § 1301(E)–(F). 
194. Id. § 1301(G). 
195. CHRIS SCHUEY & MELINDA RONCA-BATTISTA, CHURCH ROCK URANIUM 
MONITORING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE CHURCH ROCK URANIUM MONITORING PROJECT 
iii, available at http://www.sric.org/uranium/CRUMPReportSummary.pdf. 
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elevated radiation levels and contaminated water wells and 
soils provided scientific evidence supporting the public health 
risks and environmental damage that residents have reported 
for years.196 Both the Navajo Nation and the Church Rock  
community have responded to the effects of uranium mining to 
ensure a safer future for the Navajo people. 
2.  The Morris Decision 
In Morris, the Tenth Circuit upheld NRC’s decision to grant 
a source materials license for uranium mining to HRI.197 The 
court accepted NRC’s determination that increased radiation 
levels from HRI’s operation would be “negligible” and that HRI 
could “probably” and “eventually” restore the groundwater to 
drinking water quality.198 In essence, the court upheld only one 
of the missions that the AEA imposes on NRC—to advance 
uranium development—but failed to recognize NRC’s 
concomitant obligation under the AEA—to deny licenses that 
are “inimical to” public health.199 
a.  Morris’ Procedural Background  
In 1984, the United Nuclear Corporation sold HRI its 
mineral rights to Section 17 in the Church Rock Chapter, the 
site of the Old Church Rock (uranium) Mine.200 Although the 
mine shaft has been capped, HRI has recorded gamma 
radiation levels seventeen to twenty-nine times higher than 
“typical” radiation levels for the area due to the mine tailings 
remaining there.201 Unlike Section 8, the federal government 
holds Section 17 land in trust for the Navajo Nation and leases 
it to three families who live and graze livestock there.202 
Church Rock residents draw their drinking water from 
fourteen wells within the Westwater Canyon Aquifer beneath 
                                                
196. Id. at iv–v. 
197. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677, 
705 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, U.S. Nov. 15 (2010) (Mem). 
198. Id. at 691–93, 704. 
199. Prohibitions against issuance of a license, 42 U.S.C. § 2099 (2006). 
200. Morris, 598 F.3d at 705. 
201. Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 10 Morris v. United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 15. 
202. Morris, 598 F.3d at 708 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
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Section 17203 and 12,000 people living in the eastern portion of 
the Navajo Nation can use the aquifer for drinking water, 
grazing and agriculture.204 
In 1988, HRI’s application for ISL mining at four sites in 
Navajo Country, including Sections 8 and 17, triggered the 
environmental impact statement (EIS) process.205 The Navajo 
Nation declined to participate in the EIS in opposition to the 
project.206 When Petitioners, a community organization, 
environmental organization and two local ranchers,207 moved 
to intervene in the EIS process, NRC approved their 
intervention because they “use a substantial quantity of water 
personally or for livestock” near the mining site.208 After 
completing the final EIS (FEIS) in 1997, NRC, the Bureau of 
Land Management and Bureau of Indian Affairs recommended 
that NRC grant HRI’s license, which NRC did in 1998.209 
b.  The Court Approved HRI’s License Despite Levels of 
Radiation Above the Exposure Limit Set by the Atomic 
Energy Act 
The Morris court reviewed whether the conditions NRC’s 
license imposed on HRI conformed to the AEA and its 
regulations.210 The AEA prohibits NRC from granting a license 
“if, in the opinion of the Commission, the issuance of a license 
to such person for such purpose would be inimical to the 
common defense and security or the health and safety of the 
public.”211 Although radiation levels from previous uranium 
mining at Church Rock already exceed the safe limit for 
human exposure, the Tenth Circuit upheld NRC’s decision to 
grant a source materials license to HRI.212 The court’s decision 
                                                
203. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131, 
1179 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision) (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
204. Rebecca Tsosie, supra note 96. 
205. Morris, 598 F.3d at 681–82. 
206. Id. at 682 n.2. 
207. Id. at 681. Petitioners include Eastern Diné Against Uranium Mining, 
Southwest Research and Information Center, and two local ranchers, Grace Sam and 
Marilyn Morris. 
208. Id. at 682. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 694–95. 
211. Prohibitions against issuance of a license, 42 U.S.C. § 2099 (2006). 
212. Morris, 598 F.3d at 705. 
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turned on its acceptance of (1) NRC’s interpretation of 
“licensed operation” under the AEA’s implementing 
regulations, and (2) NRC’s determination that HRI’s operation 
would increase radiation levels only “negligibly,” and did not 
constitute “cumulative impacts” under NEPA.213 
In making its licensing decisions, the NRC must adhere to 
the AEA’s public health standard—“total effective dose 
equivalent” (TEDE)—the total allowable amount of radiation 
that may be absorbed by an individual member of the public.214 
The Petitioners in Morris disputed NRC’s interpretation of the 
AEA and regulations, under which radiation from existing 
mine waste was excluded from the TEDE calculation. 
AEA regulations authorize NRC to: 
[c]ontrol the receipt, possession, use, transfer, and 
disposal of licensed material by any licensee in such a 
manner that the total dose to an individual (including 
doses resulting from licensed and unlicensed 
radioactive material from radiation sources other than 
background radiation) does not exceed the standards for 
protection against radiation prescribed in the 
regulations in this part.215 
Section 20.1301 of the AEA requires each licensee to conduct 
operations “so that the total effective dose equivalent to 
individual members of the public from the licensed operation 
does not exceed 0.1 rem (1 mSv) in a year.” Notably, 
“background radiation” is excluded from the TEDE calculation. 
Section 20.1003 defines background radiation as: 
radiation from cosmic sources; naturally occurring 
radioactive material . . . and global fallout as it exists in 
the environment from the testing of nuclear explosive 
devices or from past nuclear accidents. . . and are not 
under the control of the licensee. ‘Background radiation’ 
does not include radiation from source, byproduct or 
special nuclear materials regulated by the 
Commission.216 
NRC argued that because HRI was not responsible for 
producing the existing mine waste on Section 17, the mine 
                                                
213. Id. at 687, 690, 693. 
214. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.1003 (2011) (definitions). 
215. Id. § 20.1001(b) (purpose). 
216. Id. § 20.1003 (definitions). 
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waste was not within its control, and thus, the mine waste was 
not part of the “licensed operation” to which the TEDE 
applies.217 NRC’s assertion contradicts its earlier finding that 
the mine waste at Section 17 fell under HRI’s control because 
the chain of title includes the acts of the prior land owner.218 
However, background radiation is the only material exempt 
from the TEDE calculation and existing mine waste is not 
included in its definition. As Judge Lucero pointed out in his 
dissent, NRC’s narrow focus on the “licensed operation” 
conflicts with § 20.1301’s exclusion of “background 
radiation.”219 If TEDE was only meant to apply to the licensed 
operation, then excluding “background radiation” would be 
superfluous, contrary to established principles of statutory 
interpretation.220 Nevertheless, without offering an 
explanation, the court upheld NRC’s exclusion of existing 
radiation at Section 17 because it “makes sense in its own 
right.”221 
The Petitioners’ argument that NRC’s interpretation of the 
AEA and associated regulations is inconsistent with previous 
interpretations is compelling.222 For example, NRC previously 
acknowledged in the FEIS that “[r]adiological effects during 
project construction would include natural background plus 
remnant radiation stemming from previous mining and milling 
activities near the Church Rock site.”223 Due to NRC’s internal 
inconsistency and questionable resolution of difficult scientific 
issues, Judge Lucero argues that NRC’s interpretation of its 
regulations does not warrant the court’s absolute deference.224 
Even if NRC’s calculation of TEDE is limited to the “licensed 
operation,” AEA regulations authorize NRC to impose 
protective measures when necessary.225 The purpose of NRC’s 
regulations echoes the AEA’s broad “inimical to” public health 
                                                
217. Morris, 598 F.3d at 688. 
218. Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 17 Morris v. United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 38–9. 
219. Morris, 598 F.3d at 706 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
220. Id. at 705 (Lucero, J. dissenting). 
221. Id. at 687, 690 n.13. 
222. Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 22–3 Morris v. United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 60–63. 
223. Morris, 598 F.3d at 691–92. 
224. Id. at 705 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
225. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.1001(b) (2006). 
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standard: “nothing in this part shall be construed as limiting 
actions that may be necessary to protect health and safety.”226 
This means that NRC could condition HRI’s license on its 
remediation of existing mine waste at Section 17 before or 
concurrent with its operations, as the FEIS required.227 The 
court’s limited focus on NRC’s regulation of “licensed material” 
obscures other available protective measures. Ultimately, the 
human body cannot discriminate between licensed and 
unlicensed sources of radioactive material. 
Second, the court accepted NRC’s finding that the expected 
increase in radiation at Section 17 would be “negligible” and 
rejected Petitioners’ claim that NRC failed to take a “hard 
look” at the “cumulative impacts”228 of HRI’s uranium 
mining.229 This conclusion is plausible only by ignoring the 
already elevated levels of radiation at Section 17. In addition, 
NRC’s negligible impacts conclusion is based on HRI’s ISL 
method of uranium mining that “does not result in large 
amounts of tailings,” but requires that HRI to capture and re-
inject radon gas back into the ground.230 The court defers to 
NRC’s conclusion even though it is unsupported by any 
quantitative indication of what “negligible” impact means 
because, according to the court, NEPA does not mandate that 
the agency offer hard data.231 Without this data, it is unclear 
whether HRI’s “negligible” impacts will be inimical to public 
health, and whether NRC deserves the court’s deference at all. 
It was the same lack of data that originally prevented states 
and the federal government from regulating uranium strip 
mining, which contributed to the injury and the death of 
hundreds of Navajo miners and their family members. 
If, in addition to affirming NRC’s licensing decision, the 
court were to have required adequate remediation, arguably, it 
would have eliminated a major dispute between the parties, 
                                                
226. Id. 
227. Morris, 598 F.3d at 693 n.15. 
228. The Council on Environmental Quality, the administrative body charged with 
overseeing NEPA, defines “cumulative impacts” as, “[t]he impact on the environment 
which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, 
present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions . . . Cumulative impacts can result 
from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period 
of time.” Cumulative impact, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2006). 
229. Morris, 598 F.3d at 693. 
230. Id. at 692–93. 
231. Id. at 693. 
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and may have better protected the Church Rock community. 
The court missed an opportunity to demonstrate that 
responsible, profitable resource extraction and public health 
can coexist. 
c.  The Court Approved HRI’s License Despite Its Inability to 
Ensure Groundwater Restoration 
Both HRI and NRC agree that ISL uranium mining will 
inevitably contaminate the aquifer, both during and after 
mining.232 The Petitioners disputed HRI’s baseline water 
quality assessment. They argued that the nine  “flushings” 
HRI proposed to restore water quality was too few, and that as 
a result, HRI’s surety to cover the cost of restoration was 
woefully inadequate.233 Finding that NRC had taken a “hard 
look” at the Petitioners’ environmental concerns, the court 
denied Petitioners’ claims.234 
To conduct its ISL mining operations, HRI plans to inject 
“lixiviant”—a solution of groundwater mixed with oxygen and 
bicarbonate—into wells drilled into the geological layer 
containing uranium where the lixiviant absorbs the uranium 
as it is pumped back to the surface.235 HRI will then separate 
the uranium from the lixiviant and process the uranium for 
use.236 After mining all available ore, HRI will flush 
groundwater through the pores in the wellfield to return the 
groundwater to acceptable water quality levels.237 
AEA regulations require HRI to restore the groundwater 
after the completion of an ISL operation, either to its pre-
existing condition or the maximum contamination level under 
the SDWA.238 Those regulations required HRI to provide an 
                                                
232. Id. at 694 (“Although . . . ‘in situ’ leach mining techniques are considered more 
environmentally benign [than] traditional mining and milling practices they still tend 
to contaminate groundwater.”) (quoting CONSIDERATION OF GEOCHEMICAL ISSUES IN 
GROUNDWATER RESTORATION  AT URANIUM IN-SITU LEACH MINING FACILITIES, U.S. 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NUREG-CR-6870 (Jan. 2007), available at 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0706/ML070600405.pdf). 
233. Morris, 598 F.3d at 693–94. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 682. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 695. 
238. See Domestic Licensing of Source Material, 10 C.F.R. § 40, Appendix, Technical 
Criterion 5 (2011). 
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“adequate financial surety” based on the estimated cost of 
restoration.239 The cost of restoration, however, depends upon 
the level of water quality to which HRI pegs its restoration 
efforts. The FEIS stated that pre-mining groundwater quality 
in the Westwater Canyon aquifer is “good and meets New 
Mexico drinking quality standards.”240 However, because HRI 
averaged groundwater quality data from water within the 
Church Rock mining site and outside the site from a different 
section, contrary to NRC’s directive, it calculated a lower level 
water quality.241 On this limited, potentially inaccurate water 
quality data, NRC and the court accepted HRI’s assumption 
that Section 17’s water quality was poor and HRI’s proposal to 
flush the wellfield nine times.242 Until the actual water quality 
of Section 17 has been determined, neither HRI nor NRC 
knows the proper restoration standards or surety amount. By 
allowing HRI proceed before these requirements are met, the 
opportunity for public comment will have passed. 
In addition, contrary to the AEA’s requirement that NRC 
protect public health, NRC and the court tolerated high 
amounts of uncertainty as to whether HRI’s license would 
protect drinking water supplies during mining and ensure its 
restoration afterwards. For example, although the FEIS and 
the court acknowledged that the lixiviant used in ISL mining 
may migrate to groundwater beyond the wellfield area, the 
court approved HRI’s license without mitigation 
requirements.243 In addition, the FEIS conceded that 
“successful restoration of a production-scale ISL wellfield has 
not previously occurred” and that “site-specific tests conducted 
by HRI have not demonstrated that the proposed restoration 
standards can be achieved at a production scale.”244 NRC’s 
hydrologist noted that HRI was not able to restore arsenic, 
uranium and radium levels after substantial restoration 
testing, but “it ‘was very close to’ and ‘was for all practical 
purposes at the primary water standard’ for arsenic and 
‘uranium was nearly in compliance with NRC standard, and 
                                                
239. 10 C.F.R. § 40, Financial Criterion 9 (2006); Morris, 598 F.3d at 694. 
240. Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 10 Morris v. United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 16. 
241. Id. at 52. 
242. Morris, 598 F.3d at 700–01. 
243. Id. at 704. 
244. Id. 
38
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol1/iss2/4
390 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:2 
 
radium concentrations were restored to anticipated baseline 
conditions.”245 Based on these findings, the FEIS concluded 
that HRI could “eventually” achieve restoration.246 
HRI’s past performance does not support this optimistic 
conclusion. Between 1997 and 2000, URI reported ten spills at 
its ISL sites in Texas, contaminating a total of 90,000 gallons 
of water.247 Because NRC acknowledged these concerns in the 
FEIS, however, the court held that NRC had complied with 
NEPA.248 Whether or not NRC sufficiently fulfilled its duty 
under NEPA, until HRI demonstrates its ability to fully 
restore the groundwater to its pre-mining quality, HRI’s 
license may be “inimical to” public health and safety under the 
AEA. 
Given the devastation from previous uranium mining in 
Church Rock and current, elevated rates of radiation, even the 
most “negligible,” cumulative impacts to air and water quality 
should not be tolerated.249 When the Tenth Circuit approved 
NRC’s licensing decision, expansive uranium mining projects it 
was not writing on a blank slate; nor was the failure to 
acknowledge the Navajo Nation’s history with uranium mining 
in Morris out of ignorance of that history. Arguably, the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Morris will allow that history to repeat 
itself. 
In conclusion, in HRI III, the court validated New Mexico’s 
regulatory authority over HRI’s mining operation under the 
SDWA; and in Morris, the court dismissed substantial 
protections to the Church Rock community’s public health and  
environment provided by the AEA and NEPA. As discussed in 
Part III below, these decisions jeopardize the immediate and 
long-term health of the Church Rock community250—a 
community already saddled with the degradation of 
environmental and public health from previous experiments in 
uranium mining. 
                                                
245. Id. at 701. 
246. Id. at 704. 
247. Cooley, supra note 151, at 399. 
248. Morris, 598 F.3d at 703–05. 
249. See Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 22 Morris v. United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 56–59. 
250. See Morris, 598 F.3d at 705–6 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
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III.  CHALLENGES FOR CHURCH ROCK AND SIMILARLY 
SITUATED TRIBES AND TRIBAL COMMUNITIES 
The spirit of our Federal trust responsibility and the 
clear intent of Congress demand full and equal 
protection of the environment of the entire nation 
without exceptions or gaps under the programs for 
which the EPA is responsible.251 
HRI III and Morris alter the legal and environmental 
landscape for Indian tribes across the United States. First, the 
decisions depart from traditional common law upholding the 
federal trust responsibility to Indian tribes and undermine 
modern Indian self-determination policy. Second, the decisions 
undermine the objective of federal environmental laws to 
provide comprehensive protection and to respond to the needs 
of local communities. Third, the decisions create a 
fundamental inequity between the companies extracting 
valuable minerals, the tribal communities bearing the brunt of 
the resulting pollution and the state agencies that do not bear 
a trust responsibility to the tribal community. In sum, the 
Morris and HRI III decisions set tribes, resource extraction 
companies, states and federal agencies on a collision course. 
A.  HRI III and Morris Fail to Uphold the Federal Trust 
Responsibility to Tribes 
The Tenth Circuit’s  failure to uphold the federal trust 
responsibility may have far-reaching consequences for tribal 
communities and their environments if other courts follow the 
Tenth Circuit’s lead. Although courts are not entirely settled 
as to when federal agencies should apply the principles of the 
federal trust responsibility, courts have, albeit unevenly, 
upheld tribes’ claims against the Secretary of Interior and 
private companies for polluting activities occurring off the 
reservation that harm the tribes’ natural resources.252 
                                                
251. Memorandum from Barbara Blum, Deputy Adm’r on EPA Policy for Program 
Implementation on Indian Lands, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional 
Administrators, Assistant Administrators, Office Directors and General Counsel 3 
(Dec. 19, 1980) [hereinafter EPA’s 1980 Indian Policy] (on file with author) (quoted in 
James M. Grijalva, The Origins of EPA’s Indian Program, 15 WTR KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 191, 227 (2006)). 
252. See, e.g., Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 469 F.3d 768, 788 (9th Cir. 
2006) (reversing summary judgment for federal agencies which failed to take a “hard 
look” at the impact of a geothermal project on the Pit River Tribe’s sacred, ancestral 
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The federal trust responsibility arose from Indian tribes’ 
land cessions and their allegiance to the United States in 
return for the United States’ recognition of tribal sovereignty 
and its long-term fulfillment of treaty obligations.253 The 
federal trust responsibility was also viewed as a safeguard 
against state aggression towards Indian tribes.254 The original 
perception that the federal trust responsibility only extended 
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Congress and the courts 
eventually gave way to the conclusion that the entire federal 
government bears a trust responsibility to Indian tribes.255 The 
Supreme Court has described this responsibility as one of 
“moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust.”256 
In the environmental context, courts have held that the 
federal trust responsibility includes a “duty to protect against 
damage or destruction”257 of natural resources such as 
forests258 and wildlife, and to correct mismanagement of oil 
and gas leases.259 In recent years, the Court has interpreted 
                                                
sites off the reservation. The court ordered the agencies to undo the company’s lease 
extensions and set aside its right to develop the land.); Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. 
Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating privately-held, off-reservation 
coal leases); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (upholding off-
reservation hunting and fishing rights on off-reservation private lands). 
253. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
515, 555–56 (1832). 
254. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (upholding the 
authority of the federal government to prosecute certain crimes in Indian country in 
part due to states’ ill will towards tribes: “[b]ecause of local ill feeling, the people of the 
states where [the Indian tribes] are found are often their deadliest enemies.”). 
255. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI I), 198 F.3d 1224, 
1245 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[t]he federal trust responsibility imposes strict 
fiduciary standards on the conduct of executive agencies—unless, of course, Congress 
has expressly authorized a deviation from these standards”) (quoting Felix S. Cohen, 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 225(1982) (citations omitted)). See United States 
v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Mary Christina Wood, 
Fulfilling the Executive’s Trust Responsibility Toward The Native Nations On 
Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique Of The Clinton Administration’s Promises 
And Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733, 749–62 (1995) (describing several agencies’ 
approaches towards tribes and the formal national Indian policies of the EPA and the 
Dep’t of the Interior). 
256. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942) (“Under a 
humane and self-imposed policy which has found expression in many acts of Congress 
and numerous decisions of this Court, [the United States] has charged itself with 
moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust.”). 
257. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 614, 672 (1987). 
258. Id. 
259. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(per curium) (en banc) adopting Judge Seymour’s dissenting opinion, Jicarilla Apache 
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the federal trust responsibility in the environmental context260 
more narrowly, making the judicial resolution of federal 
mismanagement of natural resources unpredictable.261 
Courts and agencies alike are unsettled as to when a federal 
agency should apply the principles of the trust doctrine. Some 
scholars argue that agencies’ trust responsibility should be 
applied when writing regulations affecting Indian country or 
when administering statutes “for the benefit of Indians.”262 
Others scholars argue that when statutes give an agency 
discretion in its decision making, the agency should employ its 
trust responsibility in making those decisions.263 Several 
courts have significantly narrowed the trust responsibility to 
statutory provisions imposing a specific duty upon a federal 
agency.264 For example, in Navajo Nation v. United States,265 
the Tribe sued the United States for approving coal leases at a 
rate that was half of their market value. Although the Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1938 imposed a duty on the Secretary of 
Interior to approve higher lease rates for the Tribe, the Court 
                                                
Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1556 (10th Cir. 1984) (affirming the trial 
court’s decision that the federal government had breached its duties under the Indian 
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 when it mismanaged Tribe’s oil and gas leases). 
260. For a comprehensive review of the “Indian trust doctrine” and related cases see 
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY § 1.9 (2005). 
261. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (holding the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs liable for damages to the Quinault Tribe for mismanagement and 
damage to its old-growth forests), with North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (Secretary of the Interior did not breached its fiduciary duty to Native 
Alaskans because the Secretary had complied with NEPA and the Endangered Species 
Act, despite the Secretary’s sale of federal property with oil and gas potential 
threatening the Inupiat communities’ subsistence reliance on the Bowhead whale and 
other species) and United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 507 (2003) (5–3 
decision) (Souter, J., dissenting) (no breach of trust where the Indian Mineral Leasing 
Act of 1938 imposed no fiduciary duty on the federal government to negotiate coal 
lease rates higher than statutory minimums). 
262. See Skibine, supra note 137, at 4; Scott Hall, The Indian Law Canon of 
Construction v. the Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent and the Unambiguous 
Answer to the Ambiguous Problem, 37 CONN. L. REV. 495 (2004). 
263. Skibine, supra note 137, at 4. 
264. See Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that there may be a “distinctive obligation of trust . . . [t]hat alone, however, does not 
impose a duty on the government to take action beyond complying with generally 
applicable statutes and regulations.”); Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. F.A.A., 161 
F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1998); Miccosukee Tribe of Florida v. United States, 980 F. Supp. 
448 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 121 
F.3d 1303 (9th Cir. 1997); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
  265. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 507 (2003). 
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declined to find a breach of the federal trust responsibility.266 
In HRI I, however, the court unanimously upheld the federal 
trust responsibility, stating, “[t]he federal government bears a 
special trust obligation to protect the interests of Indian tribes, 
including protecting tribal property and jurisdiction.”267 The 
court adhered to traditional Indian law jurisprudence when it 
interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) and SDWA regulations 
according to the Indian canons of construction,268 and adhered 
to Supreme Court precedent instructing courts to resolve 
ambiguity in favor of the Indians when determining 
jurisdiction in dependent Indian communities.269 The HRI I 
court stated: “[W]e . . . reaffirm that the [EPA] is to consider its 
strict fiduciary obligation when interpreting regulations that 
directly affect its ‘administ[ration of] Indian lands.’”270 
Notably, the HRI III and Morris courts do not overrule HRI I 
on the issue of the federal government’s trust responsibility—
they simply ignore it all together.271 
                                                
266. The court found that the Act was intended to entrust Indian tribes with 
primary authority to negotiate coal leases on Indian lands, in spite of the Secretary’s 
approval and veto power over coal leases on Indian lands. Id. at 516 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “the ‘basic purpose’ of the Secretary’s powers under IMLA is 
thus to “maximize tribal revenues from reservation lands” (quoting Kerr-McGee Corp. 
v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 200 (1985)). 
267. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI I), 198 F.3d 1224, 
1245–48 (10th Cir. 2000) (rev’d on other grounds, Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States 
Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010)) (en banc 6-5 decision) 
(Lucero, J., dissenting on this point) (“Jurisdictional status of land implicates not only 
ownership, but also the core sovereignty interests of Indian tribes and the federal 
government in exercising civil and criminal authority over tribal territory . . . [The 
trust duty] is most relevant, however, when an agency decision necessarily 
incorporates a determination as to whether certain lands are within the scope of tribal 
territorial sovereignty.”). 
268. Id. at 1245. Two of the Indian canons of construction require that treaties, 
agreements, statutes and executive orders be liberally construed in favor of the 
Indians, (Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–432 (1943); Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 551–557 (1832)) and that all ambiguities in them must be 
resolved in favor of the Indians (McClanahan. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n 411 U.S. 164, 
174 (1973); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1908)); See Minnesota v. 
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 193–200 (1999). 
269. HRI I, 198 F.3d 1224, 1244 note 13, 1245–48 (applying the Indian canons of 
construction to its dependent Indian community analysis). 
270. HRI I, 198 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Osage Tribal Council v. Dep’t of Labor, 187 
F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 
(1942)). 
271. For further discussion of courts’ movement away from fundamental tenants of 
Indian law, see Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial 
Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177 (2001); David Getches, 
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Because the federal government has regulatory authority on 
Section 17 land, the Tenth Circuit should have applied the 
canons of construction to its interpretation of the AEA and 
required federal agencies involved to act in accordance with 
their federal trust responsibility. In Morris, the court did not 
invoke the federal trust responsibility in its interpretation of 
AEA regulation 10 C.F.R. § 20.1301.272 Instead, the Morris 
court approved HRI’s license which included only the 
minimum number of “flushings” to restore the groundwater, 
despite HRI’s concession that it could not guarantee successful 
groundwater remediation.273 Such experimentation with new 
technology is inconsistent with a fiduciary’s responsibility to 
act with the diligence of a prudent trustee to manage trust 
assets of a beneficiary.274 
The location of HRI’s mining does not wholly excuse the 
federal government from exercising its trust responsibility 
against private, non-Indian activity even if Section 8 is no 
longer considered Indian country. Tribes have successfully 
asserted claims for hunting and fishing rights on off-
reservation private land.275 Indian tribes have also succeeded 
in NEPA-based suits against federal agencies to restrict non-
Indian development threatening natural resources and sacred 
sites off the reservation.276 In Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. 
                                                
Conquering the Cultural Frontier: the New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in 
Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1620–23 (1996). 
272. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Navajo Nation in Support of Appellants’ Petition 
for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 6–8 Morris v. United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 6–8. 
273. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677, 
700–701 (10th Cir. 2010). 
274. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying general 
trust principles trust responsibility of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in its role as the 
administrator of trust accounts); Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp.2d 1, (D.D.C. 1999) 
(mismanagement of individual Indian trust funds amounted to a breach of the 
government’s trust responsibility); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians Inc. v. United 
States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (“[t]he Government as trustee is 
under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the 
beneficiary” quoted in Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 170(1) (1959)); United States 
v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973) (The federal government as trustee must manage 
the assets of an tribal beneficiary according to the same standards as a private 
trustee). Cf. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 988 (Ct. Cl. 1980) 
(not all principles of trust law should apply unless they warrant application). 
275. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). 
276. Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 469 F.3d 768, 788 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(reversing summary judgment for federal agencies which failed to take a “hard look” at 
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Hodel, the court invalidated privately-held, off-reservation coal 
leases and ordered the district court to stay the mining 
operation if it found irreparable harm to the Tribe’s 
environmental, cultural, social and economic interests.277 
More recently, in Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 
however, the Ninth Circuit failed to find a breach of the federal 
trust responsibility when tribal waters were contaminated by 
cyanide heap-leach gold mining permitted by the Bureau of 
Land Management because the mining occurred on off-
reservation private lands.278 In contrast to Gros Ventre Tribe, 
in HRI III and Morris, the federal government, Tribe and 
individual Navajo retained rights and interests in the land to 
be used for uranium mining. The federal government retained 
regulatory authority over both Section 8 (part of the dependent 
Indian community of Church Rock) and Section 17 land (where 
the federal government administers the AEA).279 Therefore, 
unlike in Gros Ventre, the Tribe has an unmistakable property 
interest in the land and the federal government manages those 
properties, giving rise to a clear trust responsibility. Although 
Gros Ventre Tribe may limit tribes’ success in suits challenging 
polluting activities off the reservation where the tribe is 
without a property right, the federal trust responsibility theory 
remains viable in future cases. 
B.  HRI III Undermines Comprehensive Environmental 
Regulation 
The checkerboarding that HRI III produces will undermine 
comprehensive environmental protection in checkerboard 
areas for three reasons. First, on a practical level, the HRI III 
decision creates a multi-sovereign regulatory regime among 
tribal, state and federal governments. Under this regime, 
companies will encounter a dizzying array of potentially 
                                                
the impact of a geothermal project on the Pit River Tribe’s sacred, ancestral sites off 
the reservation. The court ordered the agencies to undo the company’s lease extensions 
and set aside its right to develop the land.). 
277. See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1988). 
278. Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801, 812–13 (9th Cir. 2006). 
279. See Robert T. Anderson et al., supra note 3, at 431–32 (discussing the extent of 
federal “control and supervision” under a statute required to create enforceable duties 
upon which a tribe may succeed on a breach of trust claim against the federal 
government, including tribal trust assets subject to a “comprehensive and pervasive” 
regulatory scheme and federal control over trust assets to the exclusion of the tribe). 
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conflicting regulations and administrative decisions. Second, 
uncertainty and confusion regarding Indian country 
jurisdiction may increase the cost of regulatory enforcement 
beyond the means and willpower of any agency, resulting in 
less enforcement. Jurisdictional uncertainty will heighten the 
stakes of each administrative decision and may exacerbate 
existing tension between states and tribes.280 Finally, the sheer 
administrative cost and duplication of tribal, state and federal 
agencies’ research, monitoring and enforcement counsels 
against a multi-sovereign regulatory scheme in environmental 
law. HRI III will create an environmental “no-man’s land,” in 
which resident tribal communities will be left unprotected. 
One need not speculate. Scholars and tribal leaders already 
criticize multi-sovereign jurisdictional schemes in 
checkerboard areas in the context of criminal and zoning law. 
For example, history shows that when states possess criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country under Public Law 280, their lack 
of attention to tribal needs and the jurisdictional complexity in 
checkerboard areas produce “legal vacuums.”281 The resulting 
public safety crisis has forced some states to concede that 
checkerboard jurisdiction is unworkable and that it is 
necessary to work with tribes to mitigate its effects.282 In a 
case involving a dispute over the Yakima Nation’s zoning 
authority, Justice Blackman asked: 
[H]ow can anyone doubt that a tribe’s inability to zone 
substantial tracts of fee land within its own 
reservation—tracts that are inextricably intermingled 
with reservation trust lands—would destroy the tribe’s 
ability to engage in the systematic and coordinated 
                                                
280. For example, the opposition of the Yankton Sioux Tribe to South Dakota’s 
development of an unlined landfill in a checkerboard area  culminated in the Supreme 
Court’s decision that the area was no longer Indian country. South Dakota v. Yankton 
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998). For a critique, see Royster, supra note 10. 
281. For a discussion of  “legal vacuums” created in Indian country when criminal 
jurisdiction passed to several states under Public Law 280 see Carol Goldberg-
Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian 
Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1418–26 (1997). In relevant part, Goldberg-Ambrose 
discusses the dispute over the dumping of human waste sludge on the Torres-Martinez 
Reservation, which erupted into violence because neither the tribe, state nor federal 
government had clear authority to stop the dumping. 
282. Carol Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-
First Century? Some Data At Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 726–29 (2006) (discussing 
tribal-state concurrent jurisdiction and cross-deputization agreements to ensure law 
enforcement in Indian country in Public Law 280 states). 
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utilization of land that is the very essence of zoning 
authority?283 . . . The threat to the tribe does not derive 
solely from the proposed uses of specific parcels of fee 
lands . . . [T]he threat stems from the loss of the general 
and longer term advantages of comprehensive land 
management.284 
Courts, states and federal agencies alike should heed the 
lessons learned from the criminal and zoning contexts and 
spare tribal communities the burden of coping with judge-
made jurisdictional entanglement. 
Second, at the policy level, the public and federal 
government should be concerned by the ease with which HRI 
III and Morris undermine Congress’s intent for federal 
environmental laws. For example, the purpose of the SDWA 
was to “assure that all citizens . . . would be provided high 
quality water supplies.”285 The SDWA and its amendments 
place special emphasis on protecting groundwater and sought 
to streamline enforcement under the Act.286 Specifically,  EPA 
chose to treat tribal lands as single administrative units to 
ensure comprehensive environmental protection under the 
SDWA.287 In its brief to the en banc court in HRI III, the EPA 
explicitly stated that “[a]voiding checkerboarding is especially 
important for purposes of the SDWA [Underground Injection 
Control] program because groundwater aquifers are not 
delineated by land ownership boundaries.”288 As Judge 
Lucero’s dissent highlighted, checkerboard jurisdiction makes 
little sense if the purpose of the SDWA is to protect 
surrounding groundwater.289 After HRI III and Morris, if no 
                                                
283. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 
U.S. 408, 458 (1989) (plurality opinion determining the Yakima Nation’s authority to 
zone land use on its reservation). 
284. Id. at 460. 
285. S. REP. No. 99-56, at 1–3 (1985). 
286. Id. 
287. Memorandum from EPA Administrator William K. Reilly on EPA, Federal, 
Tribal and State Roles in the Protection and Regulation of Reservation Environments 
to Assistant Administrators, General Counsel, Inspector General, Regional 
Administrators, Associate Administrators, and Staff Office Directors (July 10, 1991). 
288. EPA’s Supplemental Brief for the En Banc Court at 13 Hydro Res., Inc. v. 
United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131 (2010) (No. 07-9506), 2009 
WL 3375299. 
289. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131, 
1174 (10th Cir. 2010) (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
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single sovereign is responsible for coordinating the regulatory 
enforcement efforts among tribal, state and federal 
governments, SDWA enforcement efforts will lack consistency 
and will not be streamlined. 
Third, HRI III and Morris fail to recognize the EPA’s long-
standing concern that if the state has regulatory authority 
over tribes, they may neglect tribal interests. In 1982, the 
EPA’s Director of Federal Activities warned that “reservation 
needs and priorities . . . may not be adequately reflected in the 
state’s environmental policies, funding and program 
implementation” if states assumed regulatory jurisdiction over 
tribal lands.290 The EPA’s concern stems from the original 
impetus of federal trust responsibility—to defend tribes from 
harmful state policies291—and reflects the consensus that 
states had been negligent in their duty to protect the 
environment.292 In recognition of these concerns, Congress 
authorized tribes to assume primary implementation authority 
under the “treatment as state” provisions in several federal 
environmental laws.293 Although tribal environmental 
protection can implicate non-Indian activities in neighboring 
counties and cities, courts have affirmed tribes’ regulatory 
action and authority under treatment as state provisions.294 
                                                
290. Grijalva, supra note 251, at 261 n.412. See also EPA’s 1980 Indian Policy, supra 
note 251 (noting that “[t]he environmental is generally best protected by those who 
have the concern and the ability to protect it.”). 
291. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (upholding the 
authority of the federal government to prosecute certain crimes in Indian country in 
part due ill will of the states: “[b]ecause of local ill feeling, the people of the states 
where [the Indian tribes] are found are often their deadliest enemies.”). 
292. Grijalva, supra note 251, at 199. 
293. Id. at 228. Programs with “treatment as state” provisions include: Clean Air 
Act, 40 C.F.R. § 9, 35, 49, 50, and 81; Clean Water Act, 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.8, 123.31, 
233.60, 501.22; Safe Drinking Water Act, 40 C.F.R. §§ 142.72, 145.52; the Toxic 
Substance Control Act, 40 C.F.R. § 745.324 (2008); and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide 
and Rodenticide Act, 40 C.F.R. § 171.10 (2008). 
294. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 748 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[O]nce a tribe is 
given TAS [treatment as state] status, it has the power to require upstream off-
reservation dischargers, conducting activities that may be economically valuable to the 
state . . . to make sure that their activities do not result in contamination of the 
downstream on-reservation waters.”); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 
423-24 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding EPA’s authority to require upstream water user 
(Albuquerque) to comply with downstream tribe’s water quality standards under the 
Clean Water Act). For discussion of other statutes implicating non-Indian, off-
reservation interests, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond 
The Reservation Borders, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1003 (2008). 
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The Navajo Nation currently administers two of the three 
parts of the SDWA, including the UIC program, both on and 
off the reservation.295 Had tribal jurisdiction extended to HRI’s 
parcel, HRI would have had to obtain a permit from the Tribe. 
Thus, when the court determined that Section 8 is not Indian 
country, it eliminated any prospect of the Navajo Nation 
providing regulatory protection for its own community and 
ignored local demand for a livable environment. A multi-
sovereign regulatory regime in the Church Rock Chapter is 
unworkable. Overall, the HRI III decision undermines the 
EPA’s policy of comprehensive environmental protection 
“without exceptions or gaps.”296 
C.  HRI III and Morris Increase the Vulnerability of Tribal 
Communities Living Adjacent to Reservations 
The HRI III and Morris decisions inequitably distribute the 
risks and costs of environmental damage between tribes, 
states, the federal government and private companies. Going 
forward, companies in checkerboard areas adjacent to 
reservations will extract valuable resources, tribal 
communities will bear the costs of degraded environments and 
public health, and states may avoid direct accountability to the 
tribal community. 
1.  Clarifying Church Rock’s Unique Predicament 
Understanding the unique predicament of tribal 
communities living adjacent to reservations reveals the 
broader implications of HRI III and Morris. It also suggests 
possible solutions to correct the inequitable distribution of 
environmental damage, costs and liabilities. Three 
characteristics of Church Rock help illustrate the community’s 
                                                
295. 40 C.F.R. § 147.3400 Navajo Indian Lands--Class II wells (2008) (delegating 
primary authority to Navajo Nation for the UIC program for Class II wells both on and 
off the reservation, but not including the Sections of the Church Rock Chapter at issue 
in HRI III or Morris) incorporating Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program; 
Primacy Approval, 73 Fed. Reg. 65556 (Nov. 4, 2008). Although several environmental 
laws restrict tribal regulatory jurisdiction to the exterior boundaries of the 
reservation, the SDWA extends tribal jurisdiction to “the area of the Tribal 
Government’s jurisdiction,” which, under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) and (c) may extend to 
dependent Indian communities and trust allotments off the reservation. See Indian 
Tribes, 40 C.F.R. §§ 142.52, 56, 58 (2011). 
296. EPA’s 1980 Indian Policy, supra note 251. 
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predicament. 
First, if Church Rock was located on the reservation, the 
tribe could potentially regulate uranium mining under the 
SDWA’s “treatment as state” provision.297 Yet, as a tribal 
community located adjacent to the reservation, whose 
members are enrolled in the tribe, receive tribal services and 
participate in tribal affairs, Church Rock cannot benefit from 
the protections their relatives and neighbors enjoy on the other 
side of the reservation boundary. Second, after HRI III, the 
Church Rock community must take its grievances for damage 
stemming from HRI’s activities on Section 8 lands to the 
SDWA licensing authority—the State of New Mexico. 
However, the State of New Mexico bears no trust responsibility 
to the tribal community and, as noted, states typically offer 
less protection of tribal interests.298 
Third, if a non-Indian community’s health and environment 
were severely impacted by resource extraction, members of 
such a community may decide to relocate in response to the 
public health threat. However, due to kinship, ancestral and 
spiritual ties to the land, opportunities for education in the 
native language and local grazing leases, “relocation is not an 
option for Indian people.”299 Church Rock residents should not 
have to relocate. Judicial doctrine and treaties recognize that 
tribal lands were set aside for the purpose of creating a 
permanent homeland for American Indians.300 Thus, “voting 
with one’s feet”—a crucial aspect of democratic federalism—
will not protect Church Rock residents. Because tribal lands 
are the only homeland for future generations of American 
                                                
297. See statutes cited supra notes 293 and 295. 
298. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (upholding the 
authority of the federal government to prosecute certain crimes in Indian country in 
part due ill will of the states: “[b]ecause of local ill feeling, the people of the states 
where [the Indian tribes] are found are often their deadliest enemies.”). 
299. See Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands 
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 458 (1989) (noting that “[t]his 
fundamental sovereign power of local governments to control land use is especially 
vital to Indians, who enjoy a unique historical and cultural connection to the land.” 
(citation omitted)); EPA 1980 Indian Policy, supra note 251 (recognizing that “only if 
we preserve our natural environment, only then, will future generations of Indian 
people have the opportunity to choose to follow traditional ways . . .”). See generally  
Rebecca Tsosie, supra note 7. 
300. Courts have recognized tribes’ water rights as a necessary corollary to the 
establishment of Indian reservations as permanent homelands for tribes for over a 
century. See cases cited supra note 5. 
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Indians, environmental protection to sustain tribal vitality is 
essential. 
The Tenth Circuit’s decisions place an inordinate burden 
upon the Church Rock community which had no voice in 
jurisdictional policy and which is ill-equipped to absorb the 
health, environmental and economic costs from further 
degradation. When tribes cannot protect their communities 
living adjacent to a reservation, tribal communities are left 
without a directly accountable sovereign—tribal, state or 
federal. This fundamental inequity offends democratic notions 
of accountability and is plainly unjust. If future courts follow 
HRI III and Morris, the Church Rock community will not be 
the only tribal community facing increasing threats to health 
and environment. 
2.  Implications of the Tenth Circuit’s Inequitable 
Distribution of Authority, Risk and Cost 
History reveals that companies may find less restrictive 
regulatory environments on lands adjacent to Indian 
reservations. Extractive industries began development on 
tribal lands in the late 1960s, when the DOI and DOE began 
encouraging their development.301 At that time, federal 
enforcement of environmental laws on tribal lands was scant, 
creating a favorable business climate.302 In fact, it was the 
resulting industrial pollution on reservations and lands 
adjacent to them that motivated the EPA to move towards 
tribal implementation of environmental programs.303 
As environmental regulation has improved on reservations 
themselves, the regulatory gaps have moved from reservations 
to adjacent lands. Similar to HRI III, Yankton Sioux Tribe v. 
United States Environmental Protection Agency304 illustrates 
how tribes can lose land and jurisdiction when companies 
pursue environmentally-risky projects on private land in 
checkerboard areas. In Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Tribe sued to 
                                                
301. Grijalva, supra note 251, at 213–15. 
302. Id. at 213. 
303. EPA 1980 Indian Policy, supra note 251 (noting that “some reservations face 
the prospect of large-scale energy development, either on-reservation or nearby, with 
potentially massive environmental consequences for reservation lands.”). 
304. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Management Dist., 890 F. 
Supp. 878, 888–92 (D.S.D. 1995), overruled by South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 
522 U.S. 329 (1998). For an explanation of this case, see Royster, supra note 10. 
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enjoin the construction of a solid waste landfill on private land 
within the exterior boundaries of its reservation, and to contest 
the EPA’s waiver of the federal requirement to line the landfill 
to protect groundwater quality.305 The district court recognized 
the EPA’s regulatory authority over the landfill because it was 
located on non-Indian land in Indian country.306 When the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision, the State appealed, and 
the Supreme Court held that in fact, the landfill site was no 
longer Indian country at all. 307 Regulatory authority passed to 
the State of South Dakota, and the clay liner requirement was 
not enforced. Thus, Yankton Sioux Tribe illustrates how a 
tribe’s attempt to protect its communities from environmental 
degradation can provoke contentious jurisdictional issues 
resulting in a tribe’s loss of land, jurisdiction and 
environmental protection. 
It is in the interest of tribal, state and federal leaders to 
address the predicament of tribal communities adjacent to 
reservations because natural resource conflicts in these areas 
are likely to continue. As illustrated in Yankton Sioux Tribe, 
resource extraction companies may find checkerboard areas off 
the reservation appealing if regulations in those areas are 
perceived to be relaxed or ineffective.308 In addition, tribes may 
increasingly seek to provide environmental protection to all of 
their communities, both on and adjacent to the reservation. 
Since the 1980s, thirty-six tribes have developed water quality 
standards under the Clean Water Act,309 and thirty-two tribes 
are now eligible to administer programs under the Clean Air 
Act.310 The financial and administrative investment Congress 
requires of tribes to apply for, develop and implement 
environmental programs is a testament to tribes’ commitment 
                                                
305. Royster, supra note 10, at 297–99. 
306. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 890 F. Supp. at 893. 
307. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 329. 
308. See, e.g., Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 950 F. 
Supp. 1471, 1482 (D.S.D. 1996). 
309. TRIBAL WATER QUALITY STANDARDS APPROVED BY EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/waterquality/standards/wqslibrary/ 
tribes.cfm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). 
310. Tribal Air, Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/oar/tribal/backgrnd.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) (In addition, 99 
tribes are receiving air grant support, 78 tribes are monitoring hazardous air 
pollutants, 22 tribes are implementing programs to reduce toxic air pollutants, 56 
tribes have completed inventories of emission sources on their reservation.). 
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to protect the environment for future generations. 
Because tribal environmental regulation makes it more 
tedious and risky for energy companies to pursue resource 
development on a reservation, companies will gravitate 
towards land adjacent to the reservation that offers the same 
resources under state jurisdiction. In such situations, tribes 
must face the difficult decision whether to pursue 
environmental protection to protect their communities in these 
areas, while risking their territorial sovereignty and 
jurisdiction in the process. This trade-off is unnecessary and 
unjust. 
IV.  REMAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH IN CHECKERBOARD AREAS 
In recognition of its trust responsibility and the objectives of 
the AEA, NEPA and SDWA, the federal government has the 
opportunity to take two steps that could significantly decrease 
natural resource conflicts in checkerboard areas. First, the 
federal government can retain environmental regulatory 
authority over checkerboard areas in order to fulfill its trust 
responsibility to protect a tribe’s natural resources located on 
or off the reservation. Second, the federal government can 
mandate that federal agencies write “Indian Trust Impact 
Statements” to clarify when a tribe’s natural resources will be 
affected and how those resources will be protected. 
A.  Retention of Federal Environmental Regulatory Authority 
Over Checkerboard Areas 
When a tribal community adjacent to a reservation will bear 
the brunt of environmental and public health damage from a 
resource extraction project located on private land, and tribal 
environmental regulation is unable to protect that community, 
this comment argues that the federal government should 
retain regulatory authority over that land. The legal basis for 
retaining federal authority over private land in checkerboard 
areas adjacent to a reservation is twofold. First, the federal 
government’s trust responsibility to tribes includes the 
protection of certain natural resources.311 Second, the federal 
                                                
311. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 614, 672 (1987) 
 
53
Newman: Creating an Environmental No-Man's Land: The Tenth Circuit's Depa
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011
2011] CREATING AN ENVIRONMENTAL NO-MAN’S LAND 405 
 
government’s retention of regulatory authority can uphold the 
purpose of environmental laws to provide comprehensive 
environmental protection and accountability at the local 
level.312 The goal of this recommendation is not to prevent 
resource extraction, or unnecessarily impede state jurisdiction, 
but rather, to maximize the protection of the environment and 
public health by avoiding the multi-sovereign regulatory 
regimes produced by HRI III.  
Under trust law, a fiduciary is required to manage the trust 
with the skill and prudence of a reasonable person in the 
conduct of his own business.313 The duties that apply to a 
private fiduciary generally apply to the federal government as 
well.314 Because the Navajo Nation’s water rights extend to 
groundwater,315 and because the federal government must 
protect that groundwater under the AEA and SDWA (UIC 
program), the federal government’s trust responsibility 
includes the protection of the Westwater Canyon Aquifer. In 
                                                
(Where regulations required the federal government to responsibly manage and obtain 
revenue from Tribe’s forests in a manner “consistent with eth proper protection and 
improvement of forests,” the government’s excessive timber harvesting constituted a 
breach of the trustee’s [government’s] fiduciary duty.); United States v. Mitchell, 463 
U.S. 206 (1983) (holding the Bureau of Indian Affairs liable for damages to the 
Quinault Tribe for mismanagement and damage to its old-growth forests); Rodgers, 
supra note 260. 
312. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006) (requiring states to develop comprehensive 
programs or preventing and eliminating pollution in surface and groundwaters); 42 
U.S.C. § 7410 (2006) (requiring states to develop implementation plans for national 
ambient air quality standards to enforce in each air quality control region). 
313. George Bogert, TRUSTS (6th ed.) § 93 (1987). 
314. Id. See also cases cited supra note 274. 
315. 22 Navajo Nation Code § 1103(A) (2011) (Navajo Nation asserts title to “all 
surface and groundwaters which are contained within hydrologic systems located 
exclusively within the lands of the Navajo Nation; and . . . all groundwaters located 
beneath the surface of the lands held in trust by the United States of America for the 
Navajo Nation.”); See Title X Water Rights, Subtitle A--San Joaquin River Restoration 
Settlement of the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, PL 111–11, 123 Stat 
991. In addition, the majority of federal and state courts recognize that tribally 
reserved water rights include groundwater based upon the Winters doctrine. See 
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). See, e.g., United States v. Washington 
Dep’t of Ecology, 375 F. Supp.2d 1050, 1058 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (recognizing the rights 
of the Lummi Tribe to groundwater beneath the Reservation and the Lummi 
Peninsula); In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River 
System and Source, 989 P.2d 739, 745, 747–48 (Ariz. 1999) (recognizing tribal reserved 
water rights to groundwater); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Stults, 59 
P.3d 1093, 1099 (Mont. 2002) (same); But see Big Horn I, 753 P.2d 76, 99 (Wyo. 1988) 
(tribal reserved water rights do not extend to groundwater), aff’d by an equally divided 
Court, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989). 
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Morris, HRI already conceded that its ISL mining will 
contaminate the aquifer and that complete restoration of the 
groundwater to drinking-water quality is not guaranteed.316 
In the aftermath of HRI III, HRI is moving forward with 
operations that threaten Indian trust assets,317 triggering the 
EPA’s trust responsibility to protect the underlying aquifer. 
Federal delegation of SDWA permitting authority to a state 
over projects that directly and severely impact tribal members’ 
health and tribal trust resources, either on or off the 
reservation, is inconsistent with the EPA’s trust responsibility. 
Fortunately, three alternative options are available to the 
EPA. First, the HRI III majority specifically left open to the 
EPA the possibility of revising its regulations in order to 
reassume jurisdiction over Section 8.318 For example, if the 
EPA were to define its regulatory authority on the basis of an 
aquifer or an aquifer’s geo-spatial relationship to a 
predominantly tribal community, the EPA would not 
necessarily encounter the same issue of checkerboard 
jurisdiction and the HRI III decision. 
Second, the SDWA provides for “revision” of New Mexico’s 
UIC program under 40 C.F.R. § 145.32. This Section permits 
the EPA to unilaterally revise the State’s UIC program, such 
that the EPA reassumes jurisdiction over certain lands (which 
EPA did in order to assume authority over Section 8 prior to 
the HRI I decision).319 The EPA regulations under 40 C.F.R. 
                                                
316. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677, 
694 (10th Cir. 2010). See J.A. DAVIS, G.P. CURTIS, supra note 14 (noting that 
“[i]ndustry experience shows that elevated concentrations of arsenic, selenium, 
radium, uranium, molybdenum, radium, uranium, and vanadium  still existed after 
extensive groundwater restoration activities.” (internal citations omitted)). 
317. 317. LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS, URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT (2010). 
318. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131, 
1135 (10th Cir. 2010)) (en banc 6-5 decision) (“None of this is to say that EPA must 
tether its SDWA permitting authority to a statute defining the scope of the federal 
government’s criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands. Had EPA chosen to define its 
authority under the SDWA in a different way, the result in this case might have been 
different.”). 
319. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI I), 198 F.3d 1224, 
1243–44 (10th Cir. 2000). (affirming EPA’s revision of New Mexico’s authority under 
the SDWA, UIC program such that EPA reassumed jurisdiction over Section 8 because 
Section 8’s Indian country status was “in dispute.”). The final rule establishing the 
Underground Injection Program for Certain Indian Lands, 53 Fed. Reg. 43096–7 
(1988), provides EPA with the discretion to reassume jurisdiction of non-Indian lands 
even after the status of those lands is no longer Indian country, or no longer “in 
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Section 145.33, Criteria for withdrawal of State programs, 
however, effectively restrict the EPA’s ability to revise State 
UIC programs to situations in which a state is failing to meet 
the requirements of the program or to enforce penalties. 
Third, the EPA can retain authority over Section 8 according 
to its trust responsibility, to ensure adequate protection of 
substantial trust resource—drinking water from the 
Westwater Canyon Aquifer. Returning regulatory authority to 
the EPA would not amount to a de-delegation of the entire UIC 
program from the State of New Mexico.320 Nor would a 
reversion offend the HRI III decision, since the land status of 
private property like Section 8 would not change from “non-
Indian country” to “Indian country.” Returning SDWA 
regulatory authority to the EPA would not stem from the 
jurisdictional status of HRI’s parcel of land, but rather from 
the federal government’s trust responsibility to protect a tribal 
trust resource underlying private land. This solution applies 
the federal trust responsibility to licensing decisions and would 
increase the likelihood of comprehensive environmental 
protection and accountability to the community. 
Courts have protected tribal environmental resources from 
harm stemming from off-reservation industrial development in 
the past.321 Due to the highly political nature of natural 
resource conflicts, however, the federal government has lacked 
a uniform approach to its protection efforts. Without a 
coordinated approach, companies can develop resources 
adjacent to the community and potentially damage trust 
resources with impunity, threatening Indian communities’ 
ability to continue living there. Therefore, when companies 
pursue risky development projects on private lands in tribal 
communities adjacent to the reservation, and tribal 
environmental regulatory authority is unable to protect those 
                                                
dispute:” “the intent of the last sentence of section 1422(e) is to make sure that all 
Indian lands are covered by some UIC program There will be cases in which a Tribe 
does not apply for primacy or cannot demonstrate its jurisdiction, but a State could not 
administer the UIC program on those lands. The EPA must administer the UIC 
programs for those lands.” 
320. HRI I, 198 F.3d 1224, 1241–44 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting HRI’s “tail wags the 
dog” argument that a small jurisdictional reversion to the EPA amounted to a 
determination that the state’s UIC program no longer satisfied the federal 
requirements set forth in SDWA regulations. See State primary enforcement 
responsibility, 40 C.F.R. § 300h-1(b)(3) (2011). 
321. See cases cited supra note 252. 
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lands, the federal government must assume primary 
regulatory authority. 
B.  Indian Trust Impact Statements 
As discussed in Part III.A.1, the HRI III and Morris 
decisions highlight the critical problem of courts’ lack of 
enforcement of the federal trust responsibility.322 In particular, 
the Morris decision demonstrates how this problem can stem 
from a court’s choice between applying Chevron deference323 or 
the “Indian canons of construction.”324 Thus, the Morris 
decision forces us to look for better ways to reconcile federal 
agencies’ dual roles as regulators and tribal fiduciaries.325 
Before a court offers broad Chevron deference to an agency’s 
statutory interpretation, it should take special care to 
determine whether the agency is acting in its “regulating” 
capacity with plenary authority or as fiduciary.326 Where an 
agency’s role as regulator and fiduciary conflict, Judith Royster 
posits that courts should not accept any “reasonable” statutory 
interpretation an agency offers.327 Rather, courts can require 
an agency to harmonize its roles as regulator and fiduciary. 
Agencies can harmonize their dual role by drafting “Indian 
Trust Impact Statements,” a description of the trust resource 
that will be impacted by a particular project and the steps an 
                                                
322. See discussion, supra Part III.A. 
323. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 840 (1984) (agency’s interpretations of a statute it administers is entitled to 
judicial deference if it is based on a reasonable construction of the statute). 
 324. See cases and accompanying text cited supra note 268. 
325. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–82 (1886)  (upholding the 
authority of the federal government to prosecute certain crimes in Indian country in 
part due ill will of the states: “[b]ecause of local ill feeling, the people of the states 
where [the Indian tribes] are found are often their deadliest enemies”); Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567 (1903) (holding that Congress has the power to abrogate 
treaties with Indian tribes). 
326. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 
1986) (per curium) (en banc) adopting Judge Seymour’s dissenting opinion, Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1556, 1567 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(finding that “[w]hen the Secretary is acting in his fiduciary role rather than solely as 
a regulator and is faced with a decision for which there is more than one ‘reasonable’ 
choice as that term is used in administrative law, he must choose the alternative that 
is in the best interests of the Indian tribe. In short, he cannot escape his role as trustee 
by donning the mantle of administrator, a principle recently made explicit by this 
court in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir.1982).”). 
327. Royster, supra note 10, at 301. 
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agency will take to mitigate that impact. At a minimum, 
Indian Trust Impact Statements would increase agencies’ 
transparency and would potentially mitigate the federal 
government’s abrogation of its trust responsibility to tribes. 
The American Indian Policy Review Commission, an 
investigative body established by Congress in 1975 to review 
and report on federal Indian policy,328 recommended that 
agencies prepare and submit an Indian Trust Impact 
Statement to an appropriate congressional committee for 
approval before taking action that may abrogate or infringe on 
treaty rights or non-treaty rights protected by the trust 
responsibility.329 A variation on the concept of an Indian Trust 
Impact Statement would incorporate the Statement as the last 
step in an agency’s tribal consultation process.330 Tribal 
consultation was established as a means of improving 
government-to-government relations between the federal 
government and tribes. However, tribes have been 
disappointed by this promising practice due to its lack of 
substantive requirements and agencies’ failure to integrate 
tribal preferences in their decisions.331 An Indian Trust Impact 
Statement would concretize the tribal consultation process 
with a judicially or congressionally reviewable product that 
would demonstrate that an agency had carried out its trust 
responsibility in making its decision. 
Specifically, the Indian Trust Impact Statement would (1) 
describe the project to be undertaken and its expected impact 
on an identified tribal community; (2) describe the tribal 
                                                
328. 1 Am. Indian Policy Review Comm’n, Final Report 3 (1977). 
329. Id. at 137, cited in Rodgers supra note 260. 
330. See Executive Order No. 13175 FR 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000) (requiring each federal 
agency to develop an “accountable process” to ensure meaningful consultation with 
tribes and their input into federal policy and regulation). For an example of an 
agency’s tribal consultation process, see Fish and Wildlife Service, Secretarial Order 
No. 3206: American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and 
the Endangered Species Act, http://www.fws.gov/ (search “Secretarial Order No. 
3206”). 
331. See White House Meeting with Tribal Leaders: Background Paper on Tribal 
Consultation and Tribal Sovereignty, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS 
(Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.ncai.org (follow “About” tab to “News Archive,” choose 
August 2009 and follow link to the Background Paper); see also Quechan Tribe of Fort 
Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 755 F. Supp.2d 1104 (S.D.Cal., 
2010) (granting a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the tribe was likely to 
prevail on claim that the Bureau of Land Management had failed to adequately 
consult Tribe before approving solar energy project). 
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consultation process and decisions made pursuant to 
consultation; (3) set forth chosen statutory interpretations and 
rejected alternatives; (4) describe the nature and extent of 
tribal consent to the project; (5) identify any treaty or non-
treaty rights infringed or abrogated; and (6) describe steps the 
agency will take to mitigate impact to the trust resource(s). 
Where an agency’s fiduciary duty cannot be reconciled with its 
regulatory function, the agency would seek congressional 
approval for a project abrogating or infringing upon a tribe’s 
treaty or non-treaty rights. Congress could then approve or 
deny the project, and appropriately compensate the tribe.332 
The final benefit of an Indian Trust Impact Statement would 
be to restrict the role of the courts in decisions regarding the 
fiduciary duties of federal agencies and limit judicial 
subjectivity in this area.333 In the end, Indian Trust Impact 
Statements would provide an agency-based, pre-emptive 
approach to reconciling the dual role of federal agencies as 
regulator and fiduciary. In doing so, Indian Trust Impact 
Statements may help slow the current erosion of the federal 
trust responsibility and reinvigorate environmental protection 
in vulnerable tribal communities. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Jurisdictional disputes arising from natural resource 
conflicts implicate the sovereign interests of tribes, states and 
the federal government as well as a company’s bottom line. 
After HRI has recovered uranium from its lands in Section 8 
and Section 17, the land will have little value to HRI. In 
contrast, the Navajo people will depend on the land, water 
from the Westwater Canyon Aquifer, and other resources in 
Church Rock for generations to come. This natural resource 
conflict could be substantially defused outside the courtroom. 
If the EPA retained jurisdiction over HRI’s Section 8 land 
parcel and developed an Indian Trust Impact Statement, the 
tribe could at least appeal to the federal government, a 
directly-accountable sovereign, for ensuing damages.  
In the meantime, HRI is planning to proceed with its mining 
                                                
332. Final Report of the American Indian Policy Review Commission, Vol. 1, ch. 4 
(1977). 
333. See sources cited supra note 271. 
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operations in Church Rock beginning in 2013.334 The 
Petitioners in Morris have submitted a petition against the 
United States in the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights alleging violations of the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man and the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.335 
The federal government’s trust responsibility extends to all 
tribal communities. Thus the federal government should work 
to clarify regulatory jurisdiction over air and groundwater 
resources in checkerboard areas adjacent to reservations in 
order to ensure livable environments for future generations. 
The federal government should act swiftly to correct the 
inequitable distribution of authority and risk produced by the 
Tenth Circuit’s decisions. Without such action, the federal 
government will contribute to the endangerment of many lives 
and the promise of a “livable environment” to future 
generations of Navajo people. 
 
                                                
334. LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS, URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 
(2010). 
335. See Petition of the Eastern Navajo Diné Against Uranium Mining, et. al,  
against the United States of America to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, available at http://nmenvirolaw.org/images/pdf/ENDAUM_Final_Petition_with 
_figures.pdf; see also April Reese, Navajo Group to Take Uranium Mine Challenge to 
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